Constitutional policing beyond the badge Three High Court rulings redefine police accountability, from custodial violence and arrest safeguards to administrative diligence, affirming that every exercise of police power remains subject to constitutional discipline.
20, Jul 2026 | CJP Team
The relationship between police power and constitutional liberty has always occupied a central place in India’s criminal justice jurisprudence. Every coercive power vested in the police, the authority to arrest, interrogate, investigate, search, seize, and prosecute, represents an exception to the ordinary liberty enjoyed by citizens. The Constitution recognises the necessity of these powers for maintaining public order and investigating crime, but it equally insists that their exercise remain bounded by legality, procedural fairness, and judicial oversight. It is this constitutional balance that lies at the heart of Articles 14, 21 and 22, and has repeatedly been reinforced by the Supreme Court through decisions ranging from D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal and Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh to more recent rulings such as Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana.
Recent decisions of three different High Courts, the Bombay High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Allahabad High Court, although arising from entirely different factual situations, reveal a remarkably consistent judicial approach towards police accountability. Each case concerns a distinct stage of the criminal process. The Bombay High Court examined the legality of custodial violence committed during investigation and the extent to which statutory protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could shield police officers accused of assaulting a suspect. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dealt with compliance with the newly enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita and the constitutional requirement that every arrested person be informed, in writing, of the grounds of arrest. The Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, addressed what appeared at first glance to be a routine bail application but eventually transformed it into an inquiry into police negligence that had delayed adjudication of the applicants’ liberty.
Viewed independently, each judgment addresses a different procedural or substantive question. One concerns custodial violence, another concerns arrest procedure, and the third concerns administrative negligence in criminal proceedings. Yet, when read together, these decisions reveal an emerging constitutional narrative that extends well beyond their immediate facts. Collectively, they reject the notion that police accountability is confined to instances of spectacular misconduct such as torture or illegal detention. Instead, they emphasise that accountability permeates every stage of criminal administration—from the manner in which investigations are conducted, to the procedural safeguards accompanying arrest, to the institutional obligation of police authorities to cooperate with courts in the timely administration of justice.
Significantly, none of these judgments merely reiterates settled legal principles. Each court fashions remedies that seek to strengthen institutional compliance. The Bombay High Court refuses to allow police officers to invoke statutory immunity where allegations concern custodial assault to extract a confession, thereby reaffirming that violence cannot be characterised as an act performed in discharge of official duty. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, while declining to invalidate the arrest on the peculiar facts before it, nevertheless directs the Director General of Police to issue fresh circulars, warns that future violations of constitutional safeguards may invite departmental action, and treats repeated non-compliance with binding precedent as a matter of grave institutional concern. The Allahabad High Court goes a step further by imposing monetary costs on the State for police negligence that delayed adjudication of a bail application and permitting recovery of those costs from the erring officials after departmental enquiry.
What unites these judgments is not merely judicial criticism of the police. Courts have, on numerous occasions, criticised investigative lapses, custodial violence and administrative inefficiency. The significance of these three decisions lies in the manner in which the High Courts conceptualise police accountability. Rather than treating constitutional guarantees as abstract ideals, they recognise that the rule of law depends upon everyday institutional compliance. A police officer who assaults a suspect during investigation, an investigating officer who disregards mandatory constitutional safeguards while effecting an arrest, and officials whose negligence prolongs a person’s incarceration each undermine the administration of criminal justice, albeit in different ways. The constitutional injury is not confined to physical violence or illegal detention; it also extends to procedural disregard and bureaucratic indifference that compromise personal liberty and erode public confidence in the justice system.
Equally noteworthy is the evolving understanding of judicial supervision reflected in these decisions. Traditionally, courts have confined themselves to determining the legality of individual executive actions. These judgments demonstrate a willingness to move beyond adjudication of individual disputes towards ensuring institutional compliance. Directions to police headquarters, recommendations for departmental action, warnings of disciplinary proceedings, recovery of costs from erring officers, and rejection of statutory immunities collectively indicate that High Courts are increasingly employing their constitutional jurisdiction not merely to remedy individual violations but also to improve systemic functioning of law enforcement agencies. In doing so, they reaffirm the constitutional proposition that executive discretion remains subordinate to judicially enforceable standards of legality.
Another common feature is the courts’ refusal to permit procedural or statutory provisions to become instruments of impunity. In the Bombay case, Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, intended to protect honest public servants from vexatious litigation, is interpreted in a manner that prevents its misuse as a shield against allegations of custodial torture. In the Madhya Pradesh case, Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita is read in harmony with Article 22(1) and Supreme Court precedent, emphasising that communication of grounds of arrest is not a technical formality but a substantive constitutional guarantee. In the Allahabad case, the Court treats delays caused by police negligence not as mere administrative lapses but as failures that directly affect the timely adjudication of liberty.
These developments assume particular importance in the context of India’s ongoing transition from the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. While legislative reform has altered statutory language and introduced procedural modifications, these judgments underscore that the constitutional foundations governing criminal procedure remain unchanged. Police powers continue to derive their legitimacy from constitutional limitations rather than statutory discretion alone. Neither investigative convenience, administrative inefficiency nor claims of official duty can dilute the guarantees embedded in Articles 14, 21 and 22.
Against this backdrop, the three decisions merit close examination—not merely as isolated judicial pronouncements, but as markers of an emerging jurisprudence that insists upon constitutional discipline at every stage of policing. Each judgment contributes a distinct dimension to that jurisprudence. Read together, they illuminate how High Courts are increasingly deploying constitutional principles to strengthen police accountability, reinforce procedural safeguards, and preserve the rule of law in everyday criminal administration.
Custodial Violence Is Never ‘Official Duty’: Bombay High Court
The first judgment in this piece comes from the Bombay High Court, which reaffirmed a fundamental constitutional principle: the authority to investigate crime does not include the authority to use violence. In Sanjay Bapuso Dalvi & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that assaulting a suspect to extract a confession can never constitute an act performed in the discharge of official duty, thereby denying police officers the protection of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Facts and the question before the court: The case arose from allegations that a man summoned to the Shivaji Nagar Police Station in Ichalkaranji during a murder investigation in November 2008 was detained overnight, assaulted and forced to confess. Following medical evidence and the complainant’s allegations, the Magistrate issued process against the police officers for offences including voluntarily causing hurt, wrongful confinement and criminal intimidation. The Sessions Court refused to discharge them.
Before the High Court, the officers argued that the alleged acts occurred during investigation of a cognisable offence and therefore attracted the protection of Section 197 CrPC, which bars prosecution of public servants for acts committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty without prior governmental sanction.
The central issue was whether custodial assault allegedly committed to extract a confession could be regarded as an act connected with official duty.
Section 197 protects official functions, not abuse of power: Justice Sandesh Patil answered the question in the negative. The Court reiterated the settled principle that Section 197 is intended to protect honest public servants from vexatious litigation arising out of acts reasonably connected with their official responsibilities. It is not a substantive immunity from prosecution but a procedural safeguard available only where the impugned act bears a reasonable nexus with official duty.
Drawing upon the Constitution Bench decision in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari and subsequent rulings including Ganesh Chandra Jew v. State of Orissa, Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand and Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court reaffirmed that even acts committed in excess of authority may require sanction if they remain connected to lawful official functions. However, criminal conduct wholly divorced from those functions cannot claim statutory protection merely because it occurred during official employment.
The distinction was decisive in the present case. Investigation of offences is undoubtedly an official function. Assaulting a suspect to secure a confession is not. The Court therefore rejected the argument that every act committed during an investigation automatically becomes an official act. The setting of the misconduct cannot determine its legal character.
Drawing a constitutional boundary: The Court emphasised that the police possess statutory authority to interrogate suspects, collect evidence and investigate offences, but no law authorises “third-degree” methods or custodial violence. Such conduct is not an excess committed while performing official duty; it is conduct wholly outside the scope of lawful police functions.
Justice Patil accordingly held that assaulting a suspect for a confessional statement “would never be said to be an act in discharge of official duty.” Accepting the prosecution case at face value—as required at the stage of issuance of process—the requirement of prior sanction under Section 197 had no application.
Importantly, the Court confined itself to the legal issue before it. It did not determine the guilt of the accused officers but only whether the prosecution could proceed without governmental sanction. Questions relating to the truth of the allegations were left to trial.
Constitutional significance: Although framed as a dispute over Section 197 CrPC, the judgment is rooted in the broader constitutional prohibition against custodial violence. It aligns with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa and Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, all of which recognise that coercive interrogation is incompatible with Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.
The decision also reinforces the evidentiary policy underlying the law governing confessions. Indian criminal law has long treated police-obtained confessions with suspicion, recognising the dangers of coercive investigation. By refusing to extend statutory protection to allegations of custodial assault, the Bombay High Court ensures that Section 197 cannot become a procedural shield against accountability for torture.
More broadly, the judgment restores Section 197 to its intended purpose. The provision exists to protect bona fide exercise of public functions, not to immunise criminal misconduct. Had the Court accepted the petitioners’ argument, virtually every allegation of custodial violence could have been insulated behind the requirement of prior sanction simply because it occurred during an investigation.
Instead, the Court reaffirmed a fundamental constitutional proposition: official authority ends where illegality begins. Police powers derive legitimacy from law, and once those powers are exercised through violence or coercion, they cease to be protected as official acts. In doing so, the Bombay High Court laid down the first principle that runs through all three judgments—constitutional policing begins with recognising that the State’s coercive powers are always subject to constitutional limits.
The complete judgment may be read below:
Procedural Safeguards Are Constitutional Guarantees: Madhya Pradesh High Court
If the Bombay High Court’s decision placed substantive limits on police power, the Madhya Pradesh High Court focused on how that power must be exercised. In Dharmendra Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court examined the constitutional requirement that an arrested person be informed of the grounds of arrest in writing under Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), while issuing far-reaching directions to ensure institutional compliance by the police.
Facts and the legal issue: The petitioner challenged his brother’s arrest under the NDPS Act through a habeas corpus petition, contending that the arrest was illegal because the investigating agency had failed to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, as mandated by Section 47 BNSS and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana.
The State argued that although no separate written memorandum of grounds of arrest had been served, the accused had received a written notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the seizure memo recording recovery of 86.85 kilograms of ganja, and information regarding the arrest had been conveyed to his family. The question before the Court, therefore, was whether these documents constituted sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
Section 47 BNSS gives statutory effect to Article 22: The Division Bench of Justices G.S. Ahluwalia and Anuradha Shukla treated Section 47 BNSS not as a mere procedural provision but as a statutory expression of Article 22(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees every arrested person the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest.
Relying on Pankaj Bansal, Mihir Rajesh Shah and Vihaan Kumar, the Court observed that the requirement of written communication is intended to eliminate disputes over whether the grounds of arrest were actually conveyed. Written communication enables an arrested person to effectively challenge detention, seek legal representation, oppose remand and apply for bail, thereby making Article 22 a meaningful safeguard rather than an empty formality.
Substantial compliance, but a strong institutional warning: On the facts, however, the Court declined to invalidate the arrest. It held that the Section 50 NDPS notice, the seizure memo signed by the accused and the communication made to his brother sufficiently informed him of the reasons for his arrest. Although no independent document titled “grounds of arrest” had been furnished, the constitutional objective underlying Section 47 BNSS stood substantially fulfilled.
The significance of the judgment, however, lies less in this conclusion than in what followed. The Bench expressed serious concern that investigating officers continued to violate binding constitutional requirements despite repeated Supreme Court decisions, earlier High Court rulings and even a circular issued by the Madhya Pradesh Police Headquarters directing strict compliance. Such repeated lapses, the Court observed, pointed either to negligence or deliberate disregard of constitutional safeguards—both of which it described as “alarming”.
In one of its strongest observations, the Court remarked that if investigating officers routinely ignored mandatory procedures, the police department had to introspect whether it was inadvertently helping offenders secure release through illegal arrests rather than effectively prosecuting them. Procedural safeguards, the Bench emphasised, strengthen criminal investigations; they do not weaken them.
From individual relief to institutional accountability: Recognising that constitutional rights cannot depend solely upon post facto judicial intervention, the Court issued prospective directions to the Director General of Police to circulate fresh instructions requiring strict compliance with Section 47 BNSS and the Supreme Court’s decisions. It further directed that where investigating officers violated these requirements, the department should ordinarily presume deliberate non-compliance, initiate departmental proceedings and consider suspension and major penalties.
These directions mark an important shift from correcting individual violations to addressing institutional deficiencies. Rather than treating procedural lapses as isolated mistakes, the Court sought to embed constitutional compliance within police administration itself.
Significance of the decision: The judgment expands the understanding of police accountability beyond cases of excessive force or illegal detention. It recognises that constitutional policing also demands faithful adherence to procedural safeguards governing arrest. By reading Section 47 BNSS as a statutory embodiment of Article 22, the Court reaffirmed that procedural requirements are not technicalities but constitutional guarantees protecting personal liberty.
Although the Court upheld the arrest on the peculiar facts of the case, it left no ambiguity about the law going forward. Police powers remain legitimate only when exercised in accordance with constitutional procedure. Compliance with written grounds of arrest is therefore not a matter of administrative convenience but an indispensable component of due process.
In doing so, the Madhya Pradesh High Court adds a second dimension to the emerging jurisprudence on police accountability. While the Bombay High Court held that custodial violence can never be protected as official duty, the Madhya Pradesh High Court emphasised that even lawful police powers lose constitutional legitimacy when exercised without scrupulous adherence to mandatory procedural safeguards.
The complete judgment may be read below:
Administrative Negligence as a Constitutional Wrong: Allahabad High Court
If the Bombay High Court’s decision drew a constitutional boundary around the misuse of police power, and the Madhya Pradesh High Court underscored that lawful policing is inseparable from procedural fairness, the Allahabad High Court’s decision introduces a third, and equally significant, dimension to constitutional policing. It recognises that the rule of law may be undermined not only through abuse of authority or violation of procedural safeguards, but also through institutional indifference, bureaucratic inertia and administrative negligence.
Unlike the previous two cases, the controversy before the Court did not concern custodial violence, illegal arrest or investigative excesses. It arose from what appeared to be an ordinary bail application. Yet, in deciding that application, Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal transformed a routine criminal proceeding into a broader examination of how police inaction can obstruct judicial administration and unnecessarily prolong deprivation of personal liberty.
The judgment is important because it expands the constitutional understanding of police accountability beyond the exercise of coercive powers. It reminds that the constitutional obligations of investigating agencies do not end with lawful arrest or fair investigation. They equally encompass timely cooperation with judicial proceedings. Where police negligence delays adjudication of liberty, the constitutional injury is no less significant merely because it results from omission rather than affirmative abuse of power.
Facts and background: The proceedings arose from a bail application filed by the parents-in-law of a deceased woman, who were accused of offences under Sections 80(2) and 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Upon examining the material on record, the Court found no sufficient evidence indicating that the applicants had subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death. The statements of independent witnesses pointed instead to ordinary matrimonial discord between the husband and wife. Finding no material to sustain the allegations against the parents-in-law, the Court concluded that they were entitled to bail.
Ordinarily, the matter would have ended there. Instead, before disposing of the application, the Court turned to an entirely different question—why a bail application that could have been decided much earlier had remained pending for more than ten additional days.
The answer, according to the Court, lay not in judicial delay or legal complexity, but in the repeated failure of the investigating agency to furnish the necessary instructions and case diary despite repeated communications from the High Court. It was this administrative lapse, rather than the merits of the bail application itself, that became the central focus of the judgment.
The institutional failure that prompted judicial intervention: The chronology recorded by the Court revealed a sustained pattern of administrative indifference rather than an isolated procedural lapse.
The Office of the Joint Director (Prosecution), attached to the Allahabad High Court, supplied a copy of the bail application to the police pairokar on June 17, 2026. This was followed by an alert to the Superintendent of Police on June 19 and a reminder on June 29. Despite these repeated communications, the investigating agency failed to furnish the necessary instructions to enable the Government Advocate to assist the Court.
Even when the matter was taken up on 3 July 2026, the Court attempted to facilitate compliance by directing the prosecution to obtain the case diary electronically through the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), thereby eliminating any practical difficulty in transmitting records.
Yet even this direction went unheeded. Instead of producing the case diary, the police supplied only the criminal antecedents of the accused, leaving the Court without the material necessary to decide the bail application. The sequence demonstrated that the delay was not the consequence of unavoidable administrative constraints. The High Court had repeatedly reminded the investigating agency, suggested alternative methods of compliance and afforded ample opportunity to furnish the requisite records. Nevertheless, the necessary instructions remained unavailable, preventing timely adjudication of a matter directly affecting personal liberty.
Translating judicial censure into institutional accountability: Having concluded that the delay in deciding the bail application was attributable solely to police negligence, the Court declined to treat the lapse as a matter warranting only administrative criticism. Instead, it imposed costs of ₹50,000 upon the State Government, directing that the amount be paid to the applicants. Simultaneously, it granted the State liberty to recover the amount from the erring officials after conducting an appropriate departmental enquiry.
This direction is perhaps the most significant aspect of the judgment. Indian courts have frequently expressed dissatisfaction with administrative inefficiency or investigative lapses, but far fewer decisions translate such criticism into enforceable consequences. By imposing monetary costs, the Court recognised that bureaucratic negligence is not a victimless administrative failure. Where executive inaction delays adjudication of liberty, the prejudice is suffered by litigants whose incarceration continues solely because the State failed to discharge its institutional obligations.
Equally significant is the Court’s refusal to allow the burden of that negligence to remain permanently upon the public exchequer. By permitting recovery from the responsible officials after due enquiry, the judgment carefully distinguishes between institutional liability and individual accountability. The State remains constitutionally answerable for the functioning of its agencies, but the financial consequences of proven negligence need not ultimately be borne by taxpayers. In doing so, the Court fashioned a remedy that simultaneously compensates those affected, reinforces governmental responsibility and preserves personal accountability within the police hierarchy.
More importantly, the order signals that constitutional accountability is not exhausted by declarations of illegality. Administrative indifference that obstructs judicial proceedings may itself attract tangible consequences. The judgment therefore moves beyond symbolic judicial disapproval and adopts a remedial approach aimed at improving institutional discipline within the criminal justice system.
The complete judgment may be read below:
Police Accountability: From individual misconduct to institutional constitutionalism
At first glance, the three High Court decisions appear to address entirely different questions. The Bombay High Court considered whether police officers accused of custodial assault could invoke the protection of Section 197 CrPC. The Madhya Pradesh High Court examined whether the constitutional requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing under Article 22 and Section 47 BNSS had been complied with. The Allahabad High Court dealt with police negligence that delayed adjudication of a bail application.
Read individually, each judgment resolves a distinct procedural issue. Read together, however, they articulate a broader constitutional doctrine on police accountability. The common thread running through all three decisions is that the legitimacy of policing does not flow merely from statutory powers but from faithful adherence to constitutional limitations. Police accountability is no longer confined to punishing overt abuse such as custodial violence or illegal detention. It now extends to every stage of the criminal justice process—from investigation and arrest to procedural fairness, administrative diligence and cooperation with judicial institutions.
The Bombay High Court establishes the first principle: official duty cannot be used as a shield for unconstitutional conduct. Custodial assault and coercive violence are fundamentally incompatible with lawful policing and therefore fall outside the protection of Section 197 CrPC. The decision reinforces that statutory immunity exists to protect bona fide public functions, not acts that violate Article 21.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court adds a second dimension by treating procedural safeguards as constitutional guarantees rather than technical formalities. Reading Section 47 BNSS through Article 22 and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pankaj Bansal, Mihir Rajesh Shah and Vihaan Kumar, the Court holds that informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in writing is integral to constitutional fairness. More importantly, it moves beyond the individual case to address systemic police non-compliance, directing institutional reforms and departmental accountability so that constitutional safeguards become part of everyday policing rather than case-specific judicial corrections.
The Allahabad High Court completes the trilogy by recognising that constitutional injury may arise not only from misuse of power but also from administrative indifference. Police accountability includes the obligation to assist the administration of justice with diligence and efficiency. By imposing costs of ₹50,000 on the State for avoidable delay in deciding a bail application, directing payment to the applicants, permitting recovery from erring officers after departmental enquiry, and ordering an inquiry into the lapses, the Court converts bureaucratic negligence into a matter of constitutional accountability. Administrative omissions that unnecessarily prolong deprivation of liberty are treated as inconsistent with Article 21 no less than affirmative executive misconduct.
Collectively, these judgments also demonstrate the evolving role of constitutional courts. Rather than merely correcting completed legal wrongs, the High Courts increasingly function as institutional supervisors, issuing directions aimed at improving governance, strengthening internal accountability mechanisms and embedding constitutional discipline within police administration. Whether by denying statutory protection to officers accused of custodial violence, directing police authorities to institutionalise compliance with arrest safeguards, or imposing financial consequences for administrative negligence, the courts are moving beyond dispute resolution towards structural constitutional oversight.
Equally significant is the continuity they establish despite the transition to India’s new criminal laws. Although the BNSS has replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, these decisions affirm that legislative reform cannot dilute constitutional guarantees. The Constitution—and particularly Articles 21 and 22—continues to provide the normative framework within which every police power must be exercised.
Taken together, the three judgments articulate an emerging constitutional ethic of policing founded upon three interconnected propositions:
- Police powers cannot be exercised through violence or coercion that falls outside lawful investigation.
- Every exercise of coercive authority must comply with constitutional and statutory procedural safeguards protecting personal liberty.
- Police institutions bear a continuing obligation to function diligently, transparently and responsibly in aid of the administration of justice.
The cumulative message is both simple and profound. Constitutional policing is measured not merely by the absence of abuse, but by affirmative fidelity to the rule of law at every stage of the criminal justice process. In reaffirming that principle, the Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Allahabad High Courts have collectively advanced an important and evolving doctrine of institutional constitutionalism—one in which police legitimacy derives not from the breadth of statutory power, but from disciplined adherence to constitutional values.
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