SC Ruling in Imran Pratapgarhi Case: Understanding police powers under section 173(3) BNS SC judgment curbs misuse of laws to criminalize political and artistic expression

03, Apr 2025 | A Legal Researcher

The Supreme Court of India, in its judgment dated March 28, 2025, in the case of Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 410), delivered a significant verdict concerning the interplay between the fundamental right to freedom of speech and the responsibility of the police to register a First Information Report (FIR).

This case, arising from an FIR registered against Imran Pratapgarhi, a Member of the Rajya Sabha, for offenses related to a poem he shared on social media, specifically addressed the application of Section 173 of the BNS, which governs the procedure for handling information in cognisable cases and the subsequent registration of FIR.

Brief Facts and Background

Parliament Member Imran Pratapgarhi posted a video in which a poem was shared, which according to a complainant, promoted enmity between religious communities, and that it constituted imputations that are prejudicial to the national integrity.

The FIR was filed with offences under Section 302 (Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings of any person), Section 299 (Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs), Section 57 (Abetting commission of offence by public or by more than ten persons).

Mr. Pratapgarhi approached the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS read with Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR. Section 528 of the BNSS states that nothing in the BNSS limits or affects the inherent powers of the High Court to pass such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under BNSS or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India provides High Courts with the power to issue certain writs to any person or authority, including Government in appropriate cases for enforcing fundamental rights provided under Part III of the Constitution, or for any other purpose.

The High Court refused to intervene. Aggrieved, Mr. Pratapgarhi approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined the poem in question and opined, first, that there is nothing in the poem which attracted the offences mentioned before. Later, it went on to deal with the question of whether, in this case, it was obligatory under Section 173(1) of the BNSS to register FIR or not.

Provisions and case law

Section 173(1) of the BNSS states that every information relating to the commission of a cognisable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given (orally or via electronic communication) to an office in-charge of a police station and if given orally, such officer shall reduce it to writing by him or under his direction, read it over to the informant, and have it signed by the informant.

Essentially, when one gives a complaint over a cognisable offence, the police will have to record it in writing and take signature of the complainant. This record is commonly known as a First Information Report (FIR). Section 173(2) states that a copy of the FIR be given to the complainant free of cost.

Section 173(3) states that when an information relating to commission of a cognisable offence which is punishable with three years or more but less than seven years of imprisonment, the officer in charge of the police station may with the prior permission from an officer, not below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, considering the nature and gravity of the offence,

1. proceed to conduct preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within a period of fourteen days; or
2. proceed with investigation when there exists a prima facie case.

There exists a conflict between Section 173 (1)—which states FIR should be registered when cognizable offence related information comes and Section 173 (3)—which states that a preliminary investigation ought to be done for cognizable offences which are punishable for more than three but less than seven years.

In Lalita Kumari vs Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court stated that the condition sine qua non (essential condition) for registering FIR is that there must be information, and the information discloses commission of cognisable offence, the reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent for the registration of FIR.

Supreme Court resolved this contradiction in Imran Pratapgarhi vs. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 410).

Judgement and its reasoning

On Section 173

While Section 173 (1) is the general rule, according to the court, Section 173 (3) is an exception to the rule. This means that when information is given to the police, if prima facie, a cognizable offence is made out, an FIR is to be registered unless the offence is covered under Section 173 (3) in which case a preliminary investigation could follow (Para 25).

According to the court, Section 173 (3) of the BNS thus introduces a notable exception, granting the police the discretion to conduct a preliminary assessment even when the information received might disclose a cognisable offense, if it is falling within the specified punishment range.

This pronouncement highlights a significant deviation from the general principle of immediate FIR registration for cognisable offenses, as previously emphasized by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(CrPC).

On free speech and usage of Section 173(3)

In its judgment, the Supreme Court laid significant emphasis on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court went further to characterize the registration of the FIR against Mr. Pratapgarhi as a “mechanical exercise” and a clear “abuse of the process of law” (Para 36).

This strong condemnation implies that the police acted without a proper appreciation of the nuances of free speech and potentially misconstrued the intent and message of the poem. The Court also highlighted the societal value of various forms of artistic expression, including poetry, literature, drama, films, and satire, emphasizing their role in enriching human life and the necessity of their protection under the umbrella of free speech (Para 38).

In this case, the Supreme Court specifically ruled that when an allegation concerns an offence that falls under the ambit of the restrictions on free speech outlined in Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, it is invariably appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry under Section 173 (3) of the BNS before proceeding to register an FIR (Para 29).

The Court reasoned that when allegations are predicated on spoken or written words, it is incumbent upon the police officer to carefully examine the content to ascertain whether it indeed constitutes a cognizable offense

According to the Court, this initial assessment of the material does not equate to a preliminary inquiry that would be impermissible under Section 173 (1) when the information already discloses a cognizable offense. The Court underscored that the failure to utilize the option of conducting a preliminary inquiry under Section 173 (3) in cases where potential free speech violations are at issue could result in the registration of an FIR against an individual merely for exercising their fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (a), even if the restrictions stipulated under Article 19 (2) are not applicable.

Furthermore, the Court opined that neglecting to invoke Section 173 (3) in such circumstances would undermine the very purpose for which this sub-section was incorporated into the BNSS (Para 29). It would also contravene the constitutional obligation of the police under Article 51-A (a) to uphold the Constitution and respect its ideals, according to the Court.

To this end, the Supreme Court suggested that the higher police officer, whose permission is required under Section 173(3), should ordinarily grant such permission to conduct a preliminary inquiry in cases involving the exercise of free speech where the potential punishment falls within the range of three to seven years (Para 29).

This directive indicates a clear expectation from the apex court that superior officers should facilitate the process of preliminary inquiry in such scenarios to ensure that the fundamental right to freedom of speech is adequately protected from unwarranted criminal prosecution at the very outset.

Conclusion: a paradigm shift in policing free speech

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat marks a transformative moment in the jurisprudence of free speech and police powers, recalibrating the balance between constitutional rights and procedural obligations. By mandating preliminary inquiries under Section 173 (3) of the BNS for allegations implicating Article 19 (2) restrictions, the Court has introduced a safeguard against precipitate criminalization of speech. This intervention is not merely procedural but foundational, ensuring that the exercise of free expression—particularly in artistic or public discourse—is shielded from arbitrary state action.

The ruling underscores that police discretion under Section 173 (3) is not a license for inaction but a constitutional duty to scrutinise allegations rigorously. By requiring higher police authorities to authorise preliminary inquiries, the judgment institutionalizes accountability, preventing FIRs from becoming tools of harassment. This is especially critical in speech-related cases, where the line between lawful dissent and cognizable offenses is often blurred by subjective interpretations. The Court’s emphasis on the societal value of poetry, satire, and other forms of expression serves as a reminder that democratic robustness thrives on diversity of thought, even when contentious.

Critically, the judgment does not dilute the obligation to act on cognisable offenses but contextualises it. By distinguishing between immediate FIR registration under Section 173 (1) and the need for preliminary assessment under Section 173 (3), the Court harmonises competing imperatives: the necessity of prompt action in grave crimes versus the imperative to protect speech from overzealous policing. This nuanced approach ensures that the police remain guardians of both law and liberty, rather than arbiters of societal consensus.

While the judgment does not absolve individuals of accountability for speech that incites violence or undermines public order, it raises the threshold for criminal prosecution. This is a welcome check on the expanding criminalisation of political and artistic expression, which has historically been weaponised to stifle dissent.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

 

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‘Courts, Police Have Duty to Protect Freedom of Speech’: SC on FIR against Congress MP Over Poem