In the last several election cycles in India—spanning the 2024 Lok Sabha polls and state elections in Maharashtra, Delhi, Haryana, Jharkhand, Jammu & Kashmir, and now Bihar—hate speech has ceased to be a deviation from the norm. It is the norm. It is no longer a breach of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), no longer a fringe provocation, no longer the indulgence of a handful of hyper-local actors. It has become a full-fledged political method—sharpened, circulated, perfected, and institutionalised. What had once been fringe language has now become the operating grammar of election-time politics: a vocabulary of fear, a repertoire of slurs, a theatre of humiliation, and a strategy of controlled polarisation executed with astonishing discipline.
A broad comparative reading of speeches, videos, rallies, slogans, media patterns, complaints, and reports reveals something deeper than mere rhetorical excess. It reveals a political order that increasingly depends on the manufacture of an existential threat. The political message has fused with social fear. Social fear has fused with administrative paralysis. Administrative paralysis has fused with electoral advantage. In this fusion, the very meaning of democracy is being reconfigured: elections no longer offer competing futures but competing hatreds; political legitimacy no longer flows from representation but from the ability to summon and sustain anger.
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In this transformed landscape, hate speech functions as infrastructure. It builds worlds. It shapes consciousness. It reorganises neighbourhood markets, influences police behaviour, triggers vigilante assertion, and fractures interdependence at the most micro levels. It is not ephemeral. It is lived, circulated, absorbed, and enacted. In addition, its long-term damage is not only to India’s minorities, but also to India’s democratic capacity itself. Hate becomes not only an electoral weapon but also a method of governance; not only a tactic of polarisation but also a technique of population management.
This article takes stock of this new political order. It examines the imagery and stereotypes deployed across electoral contexts; the fears they stoke; the patterns of mobilisation they generate; the administrative silences that empower them; the media networks that amplify them; and, most importantly, the differential ways in which states like Maharashtra, Delhi, and Bihar adapt this infrastructure to their own socio-political terrains. In Bihar especially, hate speech became a tool to reorder caste configurations—an extraordinary strategic shift with profound implications for the state’s political future.
The fundamental objective of this “Architecture of Polarisation” is two-fold: first, to successfully consolidate a majority (read Hindu) vote bank through the construction of an existential threat narrative; and second, to systematically blur socio-economic realities and caste equations—particularly in states like Bihar—by substituting governance failures with religious conflict. This piece argues that electoral hate speech has evolved from fringe outbursts into an essential, multi-stage campaign strategy, aiming to consolidate a majority vote bank by constructing a fear-driven narrative of existential threat to the majority community.
Notably, along with the article, documents containing communal and provocative speeches delivered during Delhi, Maharashtra and Lok Sabha elections has been attached separately.
CJP’s Election Hate Watch operates as a specialised monitoring system designed to track, document, and challenge hate speech that corrodes the fairness of India’s electoral process. During election cycles, CJP’s conduct daily scans of speeches, election rallies, roadshows, religious gatherings, local WhatsApp circulation, hyperlocal events, and media broadcasts. Every instance of communal incitement is timestamped, transcribed, archived, and assessed against the Model Code of Conduct, RPA, and hate-speech jurisprudence. The process is meticulous: the team captures not only explicit slurs or violent calls but also dog-whistles, coded conspiracies (“love jihad,” “land jihad,” “vote jihad”), ritualised slogans, vigilante mobilisation, and election-season communal rumours. The emphasis is on understanding how hate operates as a political technology—where it originates, who amplifies it, how quickly it spreads, and how it shapes the emotional climate of the constituency.
A core function of the Election Hate Watch is formal accountability. Each verified violation is filed with the Election Commission as a structured MCC complaint—supported with evidence, legal references, URLs, transcripts, and explicit analysis of how the speech violates electoral norms. As complaints accumulate, CJP identifies deeper patterns: repeat offenders who face no consequences; fringe groups that act as advance agents of polarisation months before polling; the transition of hate speech from local agitators to star campaigners; the silence or selective inaction of District Magistrates; and the seasonal spike in anti-minority mobilisation whenever elections approach. The Hate Watch therefore does more than document abuse—it exposes the systemic, cyclical nature of hate-mongering during elections and highlights how institutional indifference enables its escalation.
The National Template of Hatred: How stereotypes become strategy
Across every state examined—Maharashtra, Delhi, Bihar, and during the Lok Sabha campaign—one encounters a startlingly consistent repertoire of imagery. It is a set-piece performance, travelling effortlessly from district to district, from rallies to WhatsApp forwards, from street-corner speeches to prime-time studio screens. The central character of this repertoire is the Muslim figure cast entirely outside the domain of citizenship: the eternal infiltrator, the calculating seducer, the demographic schemer, the territorial conspirator, the economic parasite, the cultural invader.
Protagonists employed to spew this hatred by the ideological majoritarian formation that most benefits from it, the RSS led-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are the constitutional CEOs of the party’s most polarised states (Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Uttarakhand). The carry forward or trickle down circulation of this hate is then by local level, recognised functionaries of far right formations, closely allied with the regime.
The term “infiltrator” is the axis around which this ecosystem revolves. It appears not merely as an insult but as a political doctrine. Hatred does not operate by merely expressing dislike; it operates by constructing the “Other” as an enemy so dangerous that even constitutional protections must bow before national survival. The infiltrator trope achieves this by collapsing legal categories—foreigner, migrant, refugee, citizen—into a single undifferentiated target. A Muslim man walking with his daughter to school becomes indistinguishable from a Bangladeshi terrorist. A Muslim vendor selling tomatoes becomes indistinguishable from a Rohingya infiltrator. This collapse is not a misunderstanding; it is a deliberate political intervention that renders all constitutional protections fragile.
Alongside the infiltrator, we see the proliferation of “jihad” conspiracies. These conspiratorial logics—love jihad, land jihad, population jihad, vote jihad—are a masterstroke of rhetorical engineering. They allow entirely ordinary, mundane aspects of life—love, marriage, land purchase, childbirth, voting—to be reinterpreted as part of a sinister plan. The beauty of a conspiracy theory is not that it is credible but that it is expansive. It can absorb anything, interpret everything, and justify whatever violence follows. For electoral actors, this is strategic gold.
This vocabulary is supplemented by dehumanising metaphors: termites, snakes, demons. Dehumanisation functions as the precursor to violence, lowering the psychological barrier between rhetoric and action. The use of such animalistic vocabulary across Maharashtra and Lok Sabha speeches shows a clear attempt to create a moral universe in which harming the target feels like cleansing, not cruelty.
Then there is the linguistic architecture of purity and contamination. In Delhi, vendors are forced to display saffron flags or publicly assert their Hindu identity. The underlying claim is that Muslim bodies carry impurity—social, cultural, or even culinary. If a Muslim vendor hides his identity, he is framed as deceitful; if he reveals it, he is ostracised. It is a no-win situation designed to make minority livelihoods precarious.
The repetition of identical metaphors across states shows a powerful truth: hate is being standardised.
The thematic trinity of existential threat
The communal campaign strategy relies on a narrow but potent set of themes, which are tailored locally but consistent nationally. These themes function to dehumanise the minority community, primarily Muslims, and position them as a singular, monolithic threat that transcends local governance issues.
1. The ‘Infiltrator’ and Citizenship Trope: Stoking demographic fear
Across Bihar, Maharashtra, and the Lok Sabha campaign, the core message is that the opposition parties are enabling “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and “Rohingya refugees” to undermine the nation’s security and steal local resources.
- Commonality- The threat to resources and identity: The core claim across all these elections is that “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and “Rohingya refugees” are being enabled by opposition parties to usurp local resources, jobs, and land, thereby changing the demography of border districts. This rhetoric is deployed to stoke the fears of demographic replacement and economic dispossession.
- Top-down amplification: This is not limited to local functionaries; it has been mainstreamed by the highest-ranking “Star Campaigners.” The Prime Minister, for instance, used the term ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) in Bihar, alleging demographic changes in border districts and announcing a mission to deport them to prevent the theft of livelihoods and resources from the youth of Bihar. In the Lok Sabha campaign, the same narrative was used to claim the opposition planned to redistribute the country’s wealth to these “infiltrators”.
- Targeting indigenous communities (Jharkhand): In Jharkhand, this narrative was explicitly used to divide and mobilise the Adivasi and indigenous communities. BJP leaders accused the ruling JMM-Congress coalition of enabling these “infiltrators” to settle illegally, thereby “stealing” resources, jobs, and land from the Adivasis. The rhetoric successfully frames the election not as a choice on development, but as a defense of indigenous culture and territory against an external Muslim threat.
- Delhi and Maharashtra: Local leaders in Delhi utilised the same language, warning residents that if the opposition won, the city would “turn into Dhaka” and that the opposition was busy making Aadhaar cards for these “Bangladeshis”. In Maharashtra, the demand for NRC/Janta NRC was raised with the promise to throw out all Bangladeshis/Rohingya.
The fear stoked: This theme directly stokes the fear of demographic replacement, economic dispossession, and national security compromise, making the electoral choice one of survival rather than policy.
2. The ‘Jihad’ Conspiracy Matrix: Fuelling moral panic and segregation
The term ‘Jihad’ is weaponised as a prefix to various social and economic activities to generate a state of perpetual moral panic within the majority community.
| Conspiracy Theme | Focus of Fear | Translation into Action |
| Love Jihad | The fear of women being lured for forced conversion, thereby undermining the Hindu family unit. | Calls for stringent anti-conversion laws and open rallies dedicated to denouncing the practice. |
| Land Jihad | The fear of systematic territorial and cultural encroachment through illegal construction of religious structures on public or disputed land. | Local-level protests and police complaints against alleged encroachment, sometimes resulting in vandalism of historical street signs (e.g., vandalising Akbar Road sign in Delhi). |
| Economic/Halal Jihad | The fear of financial disenfranchisement and economic control by the minority community. | Union Minister Giriraj Singh in Bihar urged attendees to buy only from Hindu vendors, eat only jhatka meat, and avoid halal. |
| Vote Jihad | The fear of an organised, monolithic minority vote bank undermining democratic processes. | Used to legitimise counter-polarisation tactics and urge consolidated voting by the majority community. |
| “Infiltrator” Rhetoric | Claims that “Bangladeshis” and “Rohingya” are illegally entering the country, posing a demographic threat, and stealing jobs and resources from citizens. | This rhetoric is used to call for their expulsion and removal from electoral rolls. |
Certain instances of hate speech targeted Muslims in Bihar are as follows:
1. Raghunathpur, Bihar
Assam CM & BJP leader Himanta Biswa Sarma says, “Before I came to Raghunathpur, I thought I would see Lord Ram, Lord Lakshman and Goddess Sita, but I was told that there are many Ram, Laxman and Sita here and there is also Osama. So I asked, who is Osama? This Osama is like the earlier Osama Bin Laden. We have to ensure the elimination of all Osama Bin Ladens in the state. What was Osama’s father’s name? He was called Shahbuddin…”
#WATCH | Raghunathpur, Bihar | Assam CM & BJP leader Himanta Biswa Sarma says, “Before I came to Raghunathpur, I thought I would see Lord Ram, Lord Lakshman and Goddess Sita, but I was told that there are many Ram, Laxman and Sita here and there is also Osama. So I asked, who is… pic.twitter.com/CP9MuEatpb
— ANI (@ANI) November 4, 2025
2. Keoti, Darbhanga, Bihar
Top themes from Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s campaign speech: “Bihar’s security is being compromised by letting ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) into Bihar’s land — these are the same people who divide you on caste lines, invite ghuspaithiya (infiltrators), play with your faith, and then work to undermine national security. We must not allow these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) to enter. Just as Article 370 was ended in Kashmir and Pakistani elements were pushed out, we will remove ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) from our border areas, seize the property of anyone involved in criminal activities, and distribute that property among the poor — the NDA government will do this. Elect NDA candidate Shri Murari Mohan Jha again; do not allow any element that shelters ghuspaithiya (infiltrators), breeds anarchy, or insults Mithila’s culture during festivals and celebrations.”
3. Hajipur, Vaishali, Bihar
Top themes from Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s campaign speech delivered virtually at a public rally: “Should ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) have the right to be on Bihar’s electoral rolls? I know your answer — it should not be. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi took out a ‘Ghuspaithiya Bachao’ yatra in Bihar, because all these parties fighting elections against us see these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) as their vote bank. And I believe these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) are snatching jobs from our youth, taking a share of the poor’s grain, and making the country insecure. Rahul ji, hold as many ‘Ghuspaithiya Bachao’ yatras as you want — we will pick out every infiltrator from Bihar and the country and send them out, and we will also work to remove their names from the electoral rolls. This is the decision of the Bharatiya Janata Party, this is the decision of the NDA.”
4. Harsidhi, Purvi Champaran, Bihar
Top themes from CM Pushkar Singh Dhami’s campaign speech: “We have taken strict action against counterfeiters, religious conversion, riots, and against ‘love jihad,’ ‘land jihad,’ and ‘thook jihad.’ Additionally, to curb the operation of illegally functioning madrasas and religious extremism, we have decided to dissolve the Madrasa Board in Uttarakhand. In the coming days, only those madrasas in Uttarakhand that teach the syllabus prescribed by our education board will operate. After winning Bihar, these same measures will be implemented here to ensure its safety. Who do you stand with? Will you stand with the BJP-NDA that puts the national interest above all, or will you stand with those who support ghuspaithiya (infiltrators)? Will you stand with the Uniform Civil Code, or with those who bring Shariat laws and openly give license to the oppression of women?”
5. Chapra, Saran, Bihar
Key themes from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s campaign speech: “Remember this — the RJD and Congress, drowned in appeasement and vote-bank politics, can do nothing except protect ghuspaithiya (infiltrators). These ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) have become their maai-baap (masters). They have invested all their political strength in saving them.”
This matrix directly translates into violence against vulnerable sections and the enforcement of social and economic apartheid. A BJP Councillor in Delhi, for instance, not only demanded a Muslim vendor display his name but also installed saffron flags on Hindu vendors’ stalls to facilitate identity-based commerce, explicitly propagating the slur that the “other community” spits on food.
3. Dehumanisation and Direct Incitement: The slur-to-violence pipeline
The final, most dangerous thematic stage involves the deployment of dehumanizing language that makes violence against the target community palatable and justified.
- Dehumanising slurs: Instances include a BJP member inside the Lok Sabha using Islamophobic and threatening slurs like “terrorist” and “pimp” against a Muslim MP. A BJP leader in Maharashtra, Nitesh Rane, threatened to burn someone and other leaders openly called for gruesome violence, threatening to “kill you like Insects” and chanting, “Danda uthao, Lande baghao“.
- Incitement to violence: Rallies in Maharashtra, led by figures like BJP MLA T Raja Singh, have featured anti-Muslim slurs and direct incitement. In one instance, a leader threatened to “burn someone,” while others openly chanted, “we will also cut people here and throw them in drains”. Another leader explicitly threatened, “we will kill you like Insects”. The CM of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, while delivering a speech in Bihar, likened a person to “Osama Bin Laden” and explicitly called for their “elimination”. This constant use of extreme rhetoric (e.g., “cut people here and throw them in drains”) serves to normalise a climate of hostility, making actual violence against vulnerable sections an anticipated outcome. This rhetoric aims to condition the public to accept violent elimination as a righteous act.
The Emotional Infrastructure of Fear: How hate speech manufactures threat
Hate speech may appear to be about anger, but its true currency is fear. Anger mobilises crowds; fear sustains movements. Across states, four carefully constructed fears appear repeatedly.
The first is economic fear. In poor, agrarian states such as Bihar—or in working-class belts of Maharashtra—the rhetoric focuses on infiltrators stealing government benefits, occupying land illegally, taking jobs, receiving welfare they do not deserve. This rhetoric is powerful because it taps into real economic frustrations but diverts them away from structural inequality and towards minorities. It converts legitimate anger over unemployment or deprivation into communal resentment.
The second is cultural fear. This fear takes the form of a narrative of civilisational decline. Hindu culture is portrayed as under siege; traditions are framed as endangered; festivals are depicted as battlefields. Rituals like Chhath Puja—once shared by communities—become arenas of policing and communal signalling. What was once a festival of rivers and devotion becoming a theatre of antagonism.
The third is demographic fear. It appears most explicitly in national-level speeches during the Lok Sabha campaign. By exaggerating Muslim fertility and framing demographic change as a Muslim conspiracy, politicians create a sense of population panic. Demographic fear is one of the most potent tools of ethnic majoritarianism globally—it transforms the majority into a frightened minority in their own imagination.
The fourth is sexual fear. Women’s bodies become sites of communal anxiety. “Bahu-beti ki izzat” rhetoric casts Muslim men as sexual predators and Hindu men as protectors. It converts women’s autonomy into a communal battlefield and legitimises violent moral policing. This fear is especially weaponised in Maharashtra, where love jihad rhetoric saturates both street-level speeches and high-profile rallies.
Together, these fears produce a moral panic in which majoritarian self-defence becomes not only political strategy but civic virtue.
The operational playbook of mobilisation and division
The communal escalation follows a meticulous, three-stage operational pattern designed to build momentum while providing plausible deniability to the main political party.
The three-stage escalation model: A remarkable consistency emerges across state after state: hate speech follows a three-stage escalation pipeline. This pipeline is not theoretical. It is empirically visible across the Maharashtra file, the Delhi dossier, and Bihar’s hate-speech archive.
In the first stage, fringe actors begin the work of seeding hatred. These actors are often small, semi-obscure organisations—vigilante groups, local religious fronts, hardline cultural outfits. They operate without restraint, testing the boundaries of permissible speech. Their role is to sow the initial seeds of anxiety.
In the second stage, local political leaders elevate these narratives. Their speeches are strategically targeted, naming places, identifying supposed threats, and calling for exclusion or boycott. They do the work of translating fringe slogans into electoral messaging.
In the third stage, national leaders adopt the same rhetoric. This is the most crucial moment, where language becomes law-like, carrying the weight of authority. When senior ministers repeat terms like “infiltrator”, they confer legitimacy on the entire ecosystem. What begins as street-level rumour becomes a central campaign theme.
This pipeline ensures that hate speech does not remain marginal. It becomes mainstream political messaging, producing a nationwide vocabulary of resentment. (Read: Elections 2024: The lead up to the first two phases of voting have seen far right leaders deliver anti-Muslim hate speech across India and April: CJP’s hate watch campaign analyses several hate incidents reported across the country in the last week)
Stage 1: Fringe elements get active (the groundwork)
The process begins 3-4 months before the elections with dedicated far-right organisations laying the groundwork.
- In Maharashtra, groups like the Sakal Hindu Samaj and Hindu Janjagruti Manch organise Hindu Jan Akrosh rallies, peddling the most extreme versions of the ‘Jihad’ conspiracies, including calls to take up arms. In Bihar, it was the “I Love Mahummad” campaign that led to chaos and violence.
- In Bihar, groups like the Bajrang Dal and VHP host events where convenors openly reject slogans of communal harmony and urge Hindus to take up weapons (shastra) to defend their identity. This fringe content serves as an ‘out-of-syllabus’ test balloon for later, more moderated main-party rhetoric.
Instances from Bihar:
1. Gaya, Bihar
Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Matrushakti, and Durga Vahini conducted Durga Ashtami and Shastra Poojan (weapon worship) programs at multiple locations. During the event, women brandished weapons and raised religious slogans.
2. Kaimur, Bihar
Bhagwati Shukla, national president of Rashtriya Sanatan Sena, speaking at a religious conference organised by the group, promoted the anti-Muslim conspiracy theory of “love jihad” and falsely claimed that over 3 lakh Hindu girls are killed every day in its name. He also declared that they will cut those who slaughter cows.
3. Bettiah, West Champaran, Bihar
During a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) Foundation Day event, leader Ambarish Singh made anti-Muslim remarks, claiming Muslims seek separate laws and identity. He said those who refuse to say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” “may be citizens but are not our brothers,” mocked slogans of communal harmony, and linked the VHP’s mission to ending “love jihad,” cow slaughter, and religious conversions.
4. Bhagwanpur, Vaishali, Bihar
At a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) Sthapna Diwas event, Bajrang Dal state convenor Prakash Pandey rejected slogans of communal harmony and spread anti-Muslim conspiracy theories around “love jihad,” “land jihad,” religious conversions and cow slaughter. He also urged Hindus to take up weapons (“shastra”) to defend their identity.
Stage 2: Local leaders build-up (the designated agitators)
The next stage involves “designated agitators”—one or two individuals per state who consistently make hateful statements. These leaders test the boundaries of acceptable rhetoric and generate the initial media traction.
Instances:
1. Maharashtra- Nitesh Rane peddles conspiracy theories and threaten violence in Dongri. Caught on camera threatening to burn someone and peddled conspiracy theory of ‘land jihad’
https://cjp.org.in/nitesh-rane-peddles-conspiracy-theories-and-threaten-violence-in-dongri-thane
2. Maharashtra- CJP files complaint before Maharashtra Police against serial hate offender Kajal Hindustani. In complaint, CJP urged to take strict action and seek prosecution under sections 196, 197(1), 352 and 353 of the BNS, 2023 for communal, hate speech
3. Maharashtra- CJP lodges additional police complaints against Nitesh Rane and Ashwini Upadhyay for hate speeches. Incendiary remarks by Nitesh Rane and Ashwini Upadhyay span multiple locations in Maharashtra
4. Maharashtra- Hindu Jan Akrosh rally in Mumbai sees conspiracy theories being peddled against Muslims. Leaders like Nitesh Rane, made speeches calling out ‘Jihadis’ and accusing people of bringing in ‘Bangladeshis’, and ‘Rohingya’ to conduct riots
Stage 3: Star campaigners take over
Once the ground is polarised and the themes are established, the main national leaders (PM Modi, Amit Shah, Rajnath Singh, Yogi Adityanath) step in, adopting the subtext of the hate speech—shifting from local incitement to national security and resource threat—to legitimize the narrative and reach a mass audience. This also involves the tactic of “catching” one or two Maulanas to make statements that fit the narrative, ensuring the rhetoric is framed as a response to minority aggression (e.g., the use of Imran Masood’s statement in Bihar).
Blurring caste equations and weaponising Dalits
A key analytical dimension in Bihar and the Lok Sabha elections is the calculated effort to fracture social justice coalitions by pitting Dalits, Adivasis, and OBCs against Muslims. A critical function of communal hate speech is the calculated effort to blur Caste Equations/Realities and divert attention from governance failures.
- The reservation theft narrative: This is achieved by framing any potential minority benefit (like reservation for backward Muslims, as done in Karnataka) as a direct theft of resources earmarked for Dalits, Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (STs). Senior leaders, including Home Minister Amit Shah, systematically framed any potential reservation for Muslims as a direct theft from Dalits, Adivasis, SCs, and OBCs. The explicit claim that Congress would take reservations “out from the Dalits… and give it to Muslims” is designed to create a zero-sum communal conflict, fracturing the socio-political alliance built on caste-based identity and social justice.
- Diverting from joblessness and poverty: By focusing campaign energy entirely on ‘Infiltrators,’ ‘Love Jihad,’ and ‘Reservation Theft,’ the political discourse successfully diverts attention from the real issues plaguing Bihar, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of development.
Communalising shared public and festival spaces
The strategy of division extends to hijacking shared cultural symbols and spaces.
- Festival polarisation: Festivals traditionally celebrated by both communities are being communalised, such as Chhath Puja in Bihar, where the use of VHP stickers is a new tactic to stake exclusive claim over shared cultural rituals.
- Economic segregation: The use of festivals or local gatherings to enforce economic boycotts and social separation (e.g., the paneer vendor incident in Delhi).
- Infiltrating secular institutions: Even educational institutions are being targeted, with reports of Hindutva activities like Gaushalas and Shobha Yatras being brought into college campuses like IIT-B in Mumbai, symbolically mirroring the ‘Land Jihad’ narrative in cultural and academic domains.
Targeting religious and political spaces
- Religious sites: Speeches included promises to remove mosques from Kashi and Mathura if the BJP wins a supermajority in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. The destruction of the Babri Mosque was openly glorified in Maharashtra.
- Parliamentary attacks: A Muslim MP, Kunwar Danish Ali, was called a “terrorist, pimp” by a BJP member, Ramesh Bidhuri, inside India’s parliament.
- Political rivalry: Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma made a deeply communal remark in Bihar, linking a local leader to Osama Bin Laden and his father to Shahabuddin
Instances from Bihar:
1. Gaya, Bihar
At a government event inaugurating development project, Prime Minister Narendra Modi targeted those he referred to as “ghuspaithiya” (infiltrators), alleging demographic changes in Bihar’s border districts. He asserted that infiltrators would not be allowed to steal livelihoods and resources from the youth of Bihar and Indian citizens, and announced the formation of a demography mission to deport each “ghuspaithiya” from the country.
2. Barauni, Begusarai, Bihar
Home Minister Amit Shah delivered a speech targeting those he referred to as “ghuspethiya” (infiltrators). He questioned whether they should receive voting rights, be included in voter lists, or be entitled to free food rations, employment, housing, or medical aid, claiming that Rahul Gandhi prioritises them over the people of Bihar. He further alleged that “ghuspethiyas” serve as vote banks for opposition leaders and vowed to remove each one of them.
3. Dehri, Rohtas, Bihar
Home Minister Amit Shah delivered a speech targeting those he referred to as “ghuspethiya” (infiltrators). He mocked Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s campaign as a “Ghuspethiya Bachao Yatra” and asked attendees whether infiltrators should have voting rights, access to free rations, jobs, housing, or medical aid. He alleged that infiltrators are receiving these benefits instead of Indian youth, warning that if the opposition wins, “every house in Bihar will have only ghuspethiyas.”
4. Danapur, Patna, Bihar
Top themes from Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s campaign speech: “The INDI Alliance has started a new campaign– development vs ‘burqa’. When Bihar and its youth are talking about development, Congress and RJD are trying to expand their reach through ‘burqa’. Should they be allowed to conduct fake polling? Should ‘foreign ghuspaith’ (infiltrators) be given a free hand to rob the poor, Dalits, and citizens of Bihar? Anywhere in the world, one must show their identity and face, but they want to let anyone vote without revealing their faces.”
From Rhetoric to Rupture: How hate speech reorders everyday life
Across Maharashtra, Delhi, and Bihar, hate speech produces concrete, lived consequences. It reorganises public space. It transforms markets into segregated zones. It forces everyday interactions to become declarations of identity.
In Delhi, the pressure on Muslim vendors to display saffron flags is not simply symbolic. It is a form of coercion that destroys anonymity, exposes vulnerability, and renders economic life contingent on communal compliance. In Maharashtra, boycott campaigns led to assaults on shops, disruption of livelihoods, and humiliation of workers. In Bihar, rumours about “Bangladeshi vendors” have triggered spontaneous harassment of ordinary labourers. Panchayat resolutions in various states have attempted to exclude Muslim traders from local markets—a practice that mimics apartheid structures where economic participation becomes conditional on identity.
Violence follows predictably. Mob assaults, harassment of couples, vandalism of shops, threats to imams, surveillance of Muslim-majority localities—these are not “law and order incidents”. They are direct outcomes of a discursive environment engineered for hostility.
When hate speech saturates public space, violence becomes not a deviation but an expected response. A society trained to see neighbours as infiltrators is a society primed for confrontation.
The Systemic Enablers: Media and institutional inaction
The final, critical piece of the pattern is the widespread belief that the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is a functionally dead instrument, a perception reinforced by consistent inaction on complaints against powerful figures. The piece must highlight that despite the existence of electoral laws and the MCC, enforcement remains critically weak, thus encouraging repeat offenses.).
1. The media multiplier and the digital battlefield
The media ecosystem acts as a critical force multiplier, ensuring maximum saturation of the divisive narratives.
- The role of media in propagation: The media acts as a critical force multiplier. The search results confirm that social media platforms (Facebook, YouTube, X) are key instruments for amplifying and mainstreaming hate speech, with top BJP leaders’ speeches often live-streamed across official accounts.
- AI-generated content and deepfakes: As anticipated, the Bihar election has become a test case for the use of AI Deepfakes, hate posters, and malicious Bhojpuri songs, “blurring the line between propaganda and parody”. The attempt to create an AI Deepfake targeting Colonel Sofia Qureshi and falsely linking Trishul drills to the Bihar polls is a clear example of using sophisticated technology to manufacture a crisis narrative.
- “Paid” hardliners: A crucial pattern is noted: the existence of “paid” Muslim hardliners whose provocative clips are used by the political machinery to validate the “existential threat” narrative. This creates a false equivalence, framing the majority community’s rhetoric as a justified defensive reaction.
2. The MCC Paradox: A functional impunity
One of the most troubling revelations across states is the consistent institutional inaction. MCC complaints filed by civil society groups in Maharashtra resulted in little to no prosecution. Delhi administrators took no meaningful action against blatant hate speech. Even where the Election Commission issued notices, follow-up was weak.
The paralysis is not bureaucratic inefficiency—it is political choice. District Magistrates, legally empowered to act suo-moto, routinely fail to intervene. Police forces often behave not as neutral protectors but as silent spectators or selective enforcers. Voting-day advertisements—clearly illegal—continue year after year with complete impunity.
The absence of enforcement does not merely fail to stop hate speech. It incentivises it. (Read: From Welfare to Expulsion: Bihar’s MCC period rhetoric turns citizenship into a campaign weapon)
- Lack of consequence for star campaigners: The most damning evidence comes from the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, where the Congress party explicitly petitioned the Supreme Court, stating that the Election Commission’s (ECI) “continued silence” on complaints of hate speech and MCC violation against the Prime Minister and Home Minister amounted to a “tacit endorsement” of their statements and was a form of “invidious discrimination”. The Supreme Court was eventually forced to direct the EC to decide on these complaints.
- The DM’s suo-moto power failure: District Magistrates (DMs) possess the suo moto power to initiate action against violations of law and order, including hate speech, without waiting for the ECI’s directive. The consistent failure of DMs to utilise this power effectively creates a security vacuum and raises a fundamental question: What is the purpose of the MCC if its own local enforcement arms refuse to exercise their legal authority?
- The silence period violation: A consistent tactical violation is the use of full-page newspaper advertisements on the day of voting—a direct breach of the legally mandated “silence period”. Complaints are filed every year, yet nothing ever happens, turning a legal restraint into a predictable, unpunished final campaign flourish. Complaints were explicitly filed against the BJP, MNS, and the Shiv Sena (Shinde faction) in Maharashtra for silence period violations, specifically citing political ads in major newspapers. (Read: How BJP is accused of violating 48 Hours-Silence Period even on Poll Day?)
How MCC violations become a license for electoral hate: One of the most disturbing features of India’s contemporary electoral landscape is not merely the explosion of hate speech, but the near-total collapse of institutional response to it. The Model Code of Conduct—once regarded as a moral compass and a boundary-marker—is now little more than a symbolic pamphlet. Across Maharashtra, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and during the 2024 Lok Sabha cycle, repeated, documented, and widely circulated instances of explicit hate speech, communal incitement, and even direct calls for violence were flagged to the Election Commission of India with urgency and precision. Yet the ECI’s response oscillated between silence, non-committal notices, or bureaucratic platitudes. This selective inertia has effectively rewritten the MCC: instead of a code meant to regulate elections, it has become a code that politicians can violate with impunity once they understand that consequences are unlikely, uneven, or easily deflected. The absence of deterrence becomes a form of permission.
The judicial system’s response—especially from constitutional courts—has only deepened this institutional void. High Courts routinely dismiss or defer petitions concerning hate speech at election time, often on procedural grounds, or by sending complainants back to the very authorities that have already refused to act. Even more worrying is the Supreme Court’s posture, which has increasingly adopted a stance of non-intervention, repeatedly expressing “helplessness,” “constraint,” or “reluctance” to issue proactive directions. This judicial passivity is not neutral. By refusing to treat communal hate as an urgent constitutional injury, the courts inadvertently normalise its presence in electoral politics. When the highest court of a democracy signals that it cannot act unless someone else acts first, hate becomes embedded as an acceptable mode of political communication.
This institutional abdication has profound consequences for the democratic process. It creates a political marketplace in which the loudest, most inflammatory actors gain the greatest advantage. It rewards radicalisation, emboldens repeat offenders, and silences vulnerable communities who lose faith in the very institutions meant to protect them. The MCC becomes a decorative façade, the ECI a passive spectator, and the judiciary an absentee guardian. What remains is a hollowed-out electoral field where hate speech does not merely occur—it thrives under the protective cover of institutional silence. When the state signals that hate is politically useful and legally inconsequential, it corrodes not only public discourse but the constitutional foundation of elections themselves. In such a climate, communal propaganda is not an aberration; it becomes the new grammar of democratic participation.
Some of the MCC complaints sent by CJP during these four election cycles may be read here, here, here and here.
Bihar: The strategic communalisation of caste politics
Bihar stands out for a deeper, more consequential transformation. Unlike Maharashtra or Delhi, where communal polarisation has been cultivated for years, Bihar has historically been governed by caste equations. Political coalitions were built on OBC solidarity, Dalit assertion, and the arithmetic of caste-based identities. Muslims, though electorally significant, were integrated into caste-based alliances rather than positioned as central antagonists.
In the recent Bihar cycle, hate speech has been weaponised to redraw this landscape. The infiltrator narrative is used to redirect OBC and EBC economic frustrations toward Muslims. Hate speech in Bihar functions not merely as communal rhetoric but as caste engineering. By portraying Muslims as beneficiaries of welfare schemes, as land-grabbers, as demographic threats, hate speech fractures long-standing solidarities between marginalised castes and Muslim communities. The constructed rhetoric also blurs or diminishes issues of caste deprivation and discrimination of the most marginalised where the systemic exploiters are from the dominant ‘Hindu’ fold.
This transformation is visible in the communalisation of Chhath Puja, one of Bihar’s most syncretic cultural spaces. It is visible in the circulation of AI-generated videos designed to provoke OBC anger. It is visible in the increasing recruitment of Dalit and OBC youth by Hindutva groups seeking to expand their caste footprint.
In Bihar, like elsewhere, hate speech is not simply dividing communities. It is restructuring them.
Democracy in Decline: The erosion of rights, citizenship, and public reason
The cumulative effect of election hate speech is the erosion of India’s constitutional framework. Hate speech violates Articles 14, 15, and 21 by producing inequality, discrimination, and insecurity. It corrodes the idea of citizenship by creating a two-tier system: those who belong fully and those who must constantly prove their belonging.
The damage is not simply legal. It is epistemic. Hate speech erodes the ability of citizens to think democratically. The utter failure of constitutional institutions, conceived as safeguards –be it the constitutional courts or the infamous Election Commission of India (ECI) to act decisively and punitively ensures further impunity and normalisation. Result: hate speech and its impact, crowds out substantive debate, reduces governance to identity warfare, and delegitimises political disagreement. In such an environment, elections cease to be democratic practices and become theatres of domination.
Conclusion: Reclaiming democratic integrity
The analysis demonstrates that the current surge in electoral hate speech is neither random nor reactive; it is the product of a highly organised, multi-layered, and financially supported political architecture designed to achieve communal mobilization.
India’s contemporary elections reveal a political landscape where hate speech is not an aberration but an organising principle. It structures campaigns, mobilises voters, reorganises identities, and shapes governance. It transforms neighbours into enemies and turns public space into a battlefield. It reorders caste politics in places like Bihar. It destroys livelihoods in places like Delhi. In addition, it legitimises violence in places like Maharashtra.
Most dangerously, it normalises a new political order in which fear is the principal currency of power.
India now stands at a critical juncture. If hate remains the central grammar of elections, then elections themselves cease to be instruments of democratic renewal. They become mechanisms of social control. The future of India’s democracy depends not merely on recognising this transformation but on confronting it with legal, political, and moral urgency.
Hate is not a speech act.
It is a system.
Moreover, systems do not collapse on their own—they must be dismantled.
The pre-election hate machinery that turned Maharashtra into a communal battleground:
Capital city became a laboratory for pre-election communal polarisation:
2024’s election rhetoric and weaponisation of hate across India:
References:
https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-5-hate-speech-complaints-before-ceo-maharashtra-as-violated-mcc
https://sabrangindia.in/is-mumbai-becoming-a-hotbed-of-hate