In a significant pair of rulings, Justices Tapabrata Chakraborty and Reetobroto Kumar Mitra castigated Delhi Police and FRRO authorities for acting “in hot haste” and violating Articles 14, 20(3), and 21, directing the Union to repatriate two families deported to Bangladesh within four weeks.
Delivering judgment in Bhodu Sekh v. Union of India & Ors. and Amir Khan v. Union of India & Ors., the Division Bench directed the Government of India to take all necessary steps through the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Indian High Commission in Dhaka to bring back Sunali Khatun, her husband Danish Sekh, their minor son Sabir, and in the companion case, Sweety Bibi and her two minor sons Kurban and Imam.
The Bench did not mince words, warning that executive arbitrariness cloaked as “deportation” cannot be permitted to override constitutional protections of liberty and dignity.
Case I – The Bodu Sekh Case (Sunali Khatun, Danish Sekh & Sabir)
The writ petition was filed by Bhodu Sekh, a resident of Birbhum, West Bengal, seeking a writ of habeas corpus for his daughter Sunali, her husband Danish, and their child Sabir.
- On June 24, 2025, Delhi Police, during an “identity verification drive,” picked up the family.
- Within 48 hours, without any proper inquiry, they were deported to Bangladesh on June 26, 2025, escorted by Delhi Police via Guwahati.
- The deportation was carried out under orders of the FRRO, Delhi, citing the Foreigners Act, 1946.
The petitioner contended that the detainees were Indian citizens by birth, permanent residents of West Bengal with family, land, and identity documents in Birbhum. Sunali was also in an advanced stage of pregnancy at the time of deportation.
Arguments raised by both sides
Government’s defence: Representing the Union of India and Delhi Police, the Additional Solicitor General (ASG) argued:
- The detainees admitted during interrogation that they were Bangladeshi nationals who had entered India illegally in 1998 through an unauthorised route.
- They failed to produce Aadhaar, Voter ID, PAN, or ration cards proving Indian citizenship.
- Under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the burden of proof lies on the person concerned to establish that they are not foreigners.
- The deportation was therefore valid and within jurisdiction.
Petitioner’s case: Counsel for the petitioner rebutted that:
- The family has deep roots in West Bengal, with land records and relatives in Birbhum.
- Identity documents (Aadhaar, PAN, Voter ID) were submitted to local police after their disappearance.
- Sunali’s Aadhaar and PAN show her date of birth as 2000, making it impossible for her to have entered India “illegally” in 1998 as claimed in the interrogation report.
- No due process or inquiry was conducted as mandated by the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Memo dated May 2, 2025, which required a 30-day verification from the detainee’s home State before deportation.
- The principle of non-refoulement, implicit in Article 21, bars forcible expulsion without fair procedure.
Case II – The Amir Khan Case (Sweety Bibi, Kurban & Imam)
Case background
In WPA (H) 51 of 2025, petitioner Amir Khan, a resident of Murarai, Birbhum, approached the Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus for his paternal cousin sister Sweety Bibi and her two minor sons Kurban and Imam.
- On June 24, 2025, Delhi Police detained Sweety and her children in the same “identity verification drive” that led to Sunali’s detention.
- They were deported to Bangladesh on June 26, 2025 under orders of the FRRO, Delhi.
- The deportation was carried out within 48 hours, without reference to West Bengal authorities, and without the mandatory 30-day verification.
Arguments raised by both sides
Government’s defence:
- The ASG argued that Sweety and her children admitted to being Bangladeshi nationals during interrogation.
- They failed to produce valid documents proving Indian citizenship.
- Under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the burden of proof lies on the person to establish that they are not foreigners.
- Maintainability was challenged: since the deportation order was passed in Delhi, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction, especially as a petition had already been filed in Delhi High Court and withdrawn.
Petitioner’s case:
- Amir Khan submitted that Sweety’s family are permanent residents of West Bengal, with land, relatives, and documentary proof in Birbhum.
- He produced Imam’s birth certificate, proving Indian origin, which was ignored by authorities.
- He argued that the principle of non-refoulement, implicit in Article 21, bars forcible expulsion without fair process.
- The deportation was conducted in breach of the MHA memo of 02.05.2025, which required the case to be referred to the State of West Bengal for verification.
The Court’s observations in both the cases
On maintainability: Rejecting objections that the case should have been filed in Delhi, the Court held that:
- The cause of action was integrally linked to West Bengal, since the detainees hailed from Birbhum, where the petitioner lodged his complaint.
- West Bengal Police had verified their documents and written to Delhi Police, but received no response.
“If such enquiry is an event of substance i.e. an event which is a material, essential or integral part of the lis connected with the action that is impugned in a writ petition, there is no plausible reason as to why the same should not be construed as constituting a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. The facts required to form the basis of presumption of law would emanate only upon an enquiry to be conducted, routed through the detainees’ place of residence in the State of West Bengal.” (Para 24)
On suspicion and proof: The Court shredded the reliance on police interrogation reports, calling them unreliable and contradictory:
“A close perusal of the interrogation forms as annexed would reveal that after noting the educational qualification, the name of the institute has been omitted. In the column ‘details of family members and where they are residing’, the names of family members have been mentioned without mentioning the place where they are residing. Suspicion, howsoever high, cannot be a substitute of actual proof. There is no appellate authority. In the affidavit filed by the respondent nos. 1 to 4, it is stated that no enquiry was required but in the memo date 23.06.2025 it was stated that an enquiry was conducted. There is also no ‘adverse security report’ against the detainees.” (Para 30)
It also pointed out the glaring absurdity:
“That the proceeding for deportation was conducted in hot haste is furthered by the fact that in the interrogation report, it was stated that Sunali had crossed over and illegally entered into India sometime in the year 1998. Sunali’s Aadhaar card and PAN card reflect her date of birth as 26 years, indicating she was born in the year 2000. Hence, Sunali could not have entered into India in 1998.” (Para 31)
On police “confessions”: The Court strongly disbelieved the so-called admissions:
“The law presumes that a statement to a police officer may have been obtained through pressure or force and is therefore not voluntary. A confessional statement made before a police officer and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India.” (Para 30)
The interrogation report was riddled with contradictions and omissions—no mention of educational institutes, vague details of relatives, and an absurd claim of Sunali’s illegal entry in 1998 despite her year of birth being 2000.
On liberty over technicalities: When faced with objections on jurisdiction, suppression of earlier petitions, or non-impleadment of FRRO, the Bench invoked constitutional principle:
“Moreover, the storied jurisprudence on the anvil of protection of constitutional rights in this country, has repeatedly held that when substantial justice is pitted against technical considerations, the cause of the former demands preference over the other especially when the writ court can visualise that deference to such technical considerations would have the consequence of throwing out an otherwise meritorious claim right at the threshold.” (Para 32)
On violation of due process: The Court exposed blatant non-compliance with the MHA’s Memo of May 2, 2025, which prescribed:
- A mandatory 30-day inquiry routed through the home State if a detainee claimed Indian citizenship.
- Communication between States before deportation.
- Deportation only after completion of inquiry and biometric verification.
Instead, Delhi Police deported the family within two days, without informing West Bengal authorities. In its order, the Court stressed that this “hot haste” was unconstitutional.
“Having said this it cannot be denied that the memo of 02.05.2025 applies only to Bangladeshi and Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar; thus, if we take the worst-case scenario of the detainees, that they were not Indian citizens, the steps and procedures laid down in the memo ought to have been followed by the concerned authorities. Not following such procedure and acting in hot haste to deport them is a clear violation which renders the deportation order bad in law and liable to be set aside. The process and procedure adopted in the deportation raise a suspicion that the concerned authorities, while acting in hot haste, have clearly violated the provisions of the memo dated 02.05.2025.” (Para 33)
Before issuing directions, the Bench addressed the central flaw in the deportation: the failure to comply with the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Memo dated 02.05.2025.
“From such sequence of facts it is explicit that the respondents admittedly did not follow the provisions of the memo dated 02.05.2025 inasmuch as the details of the said persons were not forwarded to the State of West Bengal of which they are the residents. It is only after such documents are forwarded, the concerned State Government has to ensure that appropriate report is sent to the deporting State Government/UT after proper verification within a period of 30 days. Admittedly no such enquiry was conducted and the Delhi Administration did not even wait for a week before issuance the order of deportation.” (Para 32)
On executive arbitrariness: The Court powerfully reminded the State:
“The life style of the people shapes the profile of the law and not vice versa. Law cannot be disjuncted from context. The fundamental rights cannot be read as dull lifeless words. If an uncontrolled or unguided power is conferred without any reasonable and proper standards or limits being laid down in the enactment for guidance and control of exercise of such power, the act cannot by the furthest of imagination be construed to be a ‘procedure established by law’.” (Para 35)
And further:
“The executive cannot be vested with any non-fettered discretion. If officials exercise their public authority in an arbitral whimsical manner, the same would bring such act within the scope of prohibition of the equity clause.” (Para 35)
Final Directions
Having built this foundation, the Bench issued its emphatic direction:
“For and on the strength of the totality of reasons afore-indicated, the order of detention dated 24.06.2025 and the order of deportation dated 26.06.2025, so far as Sunali, Danish and Sabir are concerned, are set aside and the respondent nos. 1 to 6, are mandatorily directed to take all steps to bring back Sunali, Danish and Sabir to India within a period of 4 weeks from the date of communication of the order. The said respondents, for such purpose, shall make necessary correspondence and interact with the authorities at High Commission of India, Dhaka, Bangladesh.” (Para 36)
- The detention order of June 24, 2025, and deportation order of June 26, 2025 were set aside.
- The Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, FRRO Delhi, and Delhi Police were mandatorily directed to repatriate Sunali, Danish, and Sabir within four weeks, by liaising with the Indian High Commission in Dhaka.
- A plea by the Union’s counsel to stay the judgment was rejected outright.
In the epilogue, the Court showed zero tolerance for delay:
“Mr. Tiwari, learned senior advocate appearing for the respondent nos. 1 to 4 prays for stay of operation of the order. Such prayer is considered and rejected.”
Common Threads in Both Cases
- Procedural illegality: In both cases, the MHA memo of 2 May 2025 was disregarded, and deportation was carried out in “hot haste” within 48 hours.
- Confessional statements rejected: The Bench refused to treat statements made before police as voluntary or binding.
- Suspicion ≠ Proof: Reliance on vague interrogation forms was dismissed as constitutionally inadequate.
- Article 21 as a shield: The principle of non-refoulement and the guarantee of fairness were read into the right to life and liberty.
- Restorative remedy: Both judgments not only set aside the illegal orders but directed active repatriation within a fixed timeframe.
- Stay refused: In both matters, the Court showed urgency, refusing to stay its own orders.
Key significance of both the judgments
The Calcutta High Court converted both the habeas corpus petitions from a procedural safeguard into a restorative mandate, compelling the State not only to stop violating liberty but to actively restore it within four weeks. By rejecting technical objections, demolishing coerced “confessions,” and refusing to stay its own orders, the Bench has made it clear: executive zeal cannot displace constitutional guarantees.
This judgment will stand as a landmark against arbitrary deportations, a reminder that suspicion is not proof, and an assertion that liberty lost must be liberty restored.
- Due process restored: Deportation, even of alleged foreigners, must follow strict statutory and constitutional safeguards.
- Suspicion is not citizenship proof: Courts will not permit arbitrary determinations based on police reports or coerced confessions.
- Article 21 expanded: Fairness, reasonableness, and dignity apply equally to citizens and non-citizens.
- Executive overreach checked: The Bench warned against “overenthusiasm” by officials and reaffirmed that arbitrary discretion is unconstitutional.
- Restorative habeas corpus: The Court moved beyond quashing illegal orders to actively commanding repatriation within four weeks.
The Calcutta High Court has not only ordered the return of a wrongfully deported families but also delivered a landmark reminder that the Constitution forbids arbitrary expulsions, and that suspicion, coercion, or bureaucratic zeal cannot strip individuals of their right to liberty and due process. Together, the Bodu Sekh and Amir Khan rulings stand as a landmark reminder that the Constitution forbids arbitrary expulsions, and that liberty curtailed unlawfully must be affirmatively restored.
Judgment of both the cases may be read below.
Bhodu Sheikh case is below:
Amir Khan case judgment is below:
Image Courtesy: siasat.com
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