The Supreme Court has held that the 24-hour period within which an arrested person must be produced before a Magistrate begins from the moment their liberty is effectively curtailed by investigating authorities, and not from the time at which their formal arrest is recorded. The Court has made clear that investigating agencies cannot keep a person under their control during search, seizure or questioning and subsequently claim that the constitutional clock began only when an arrest memo was prepared.
In Sujit Das and Others v. Union of India, a judgment delivered on November 5, 2026, a Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar examined the scope of Article 22(2) of the Constitution, which requires every arrested and detained person to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest, excluding only the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s court.
The judgment is significant not only for clarifying when this constitutional deadline begins, but also for reinforcing the role of judicial oversight in preventing arbitrary detention and custodial abuse. It rejects the creation of an intermediate category of detention in which a person is deprived of their liberty but is not treated as arrested for the purpose of constitutional protection. The Court has also clarified that compliance with the 24-hour ceiling does not, by itself, make detention lawful: the period of detention must also be reasonable in the circumstances.
“the magistrate shall also examine at the time of production whether the detention of the person produced, though is within the time frame of 24 hours, has exceeded the period which can be construed to be reasonable in the circumstances of the case. If he is satisfied that detention in custody has been for a longer period than what is reasonable, he may decline remand” (Para 69 (vii))
The case: Detained on September 29, formally arrested the following day
The case arose from an NDPS investigation in Tripura. On September 29, 2025, officers of the Customs Division intercepted a truck travelling towards Agartala on the basis of information that it was carrying narcotic substances concealed in a consignment of ginger. The persons travelling in the vehicle were intercepted at approximately 2 pm at Shanitala Noabadi.
The search resulted in the recovery of narcotic substances. It continued at the Customs Division office in Agartala, where further contraband was recovered from trolley bags concealed beneath the ginger consignment. The total quantity seized was 60.79 kg. The search and seizure procedure was completed at approximately 5 pm on September 29.
However, the appellants were formally shown as arrested only on September 30, at 11 am and 11.15 am. They were produced before a Judicial Magistrate at 4.45 pm that day and remanded to judicial custody.
Their bail applications were rejected by the Special Judge and subsequently by the Tripura High Court. The High Court relied, among other considerations, on Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, which imposes stringent conditions for granting bail in specified NDPS cases.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellants raised a separate and fundamental constitutional objection. They argued that their liberty had been curtailed when they were intercepted and brought under the control of the investigating team at 2 pm on September 29. If that was the point from which the 24-hour period began, they should have been produced before a Magistrate by 2 pm on September 30. Their production at 4.45 pm was therefore beyond the constitutionally permitted period.
The investigating agency disputed this interpretation. It maintained that the appellants had merely been intercepted on September 29 and were not detained until their formal arrests the following morning. It argued that the intervening period was required to complete the procedures prescribed under the NDPS Act, including search and seizure, weighing and testing the seized substances, preparing seizure documents and carrying out other investigative formalities.
The agency also relied on Rule 3(4) of the NDPS (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022, which prescribes procedures for the classification, weighing, packaging and numbering of seized substances in the presence of witnesses and the person from whose possession they were recovered.
The Supreme Court directed the investigating officer to explain the period between the interception, completion of the search and seizure, formal arrest and production before the Magistrate. The central question was whether the investigating agency could treat the period during which the appellants were under its control as something other than detention for the purposes of Article 22(2).
The constitutional meaning of arrest cannot depend on the investigating agency’s paperwork
The Court approached the question by examining the language and purpose of Article 22(2). It noted that the provision refers to a person who is “arrested and detained in custody”. The expressions are used conjunctively, and the Court rejected the attempt to treat them as two separate events so that the constitutional deadline could be postponed until formal arrest.
It held that the Constitution does not recognise detention dehors arrest. In other words, a person cannot be deprived of their liberty and kept under the control of investigating authorities while being placed in a legally indeterminate category of detention that falls outside the protection of Article 22(2).
“ Any attempt to draw an artificial distinction between ‘arrest’ and ‘detention’ would dilute or negate the fundamental protection guaranteed by the Constitution under clause (2) of Article 22. Such an endeavour should be avoided. We must adopt that interpretation which enhances and furthers the constitutional objective.” (Para 58)
The Court explained that the relevant consideration is whether the person has been deprived of their personal liberty and is no longer free to leave. It referred to its earlier decisions, including Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, to examine the meaning of arrest and custody. These decisions recognise that the question of custody depends on the actual restraint imposed on an individual, rather than merely the terminology used by the authorities.
Applying this understanding, the Court held that the 24-hour period begins when a person is taken under the control of an investigating authority and their liberty is effectively curtailed. The formal arrest memo cannot determine the commencement of the constitutional deadline.
The Court also rejected the proposition that statutory procedures under the NDPS Act could justify a period of detention outside Article 22(2). It acknowledged the requirements governing search and seizure but held that these procedures cannot be used to postpone constitutional safeguards. Once a person’s liberty has been curtailed, the time spent on investigative or administrative procedures cannot be excluded from the 24-hour calculation. The only period that can be excluded is the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s court, as expressly provided under Article 22(2).
“Article 22(2) does not sanction exclusion of the time taken for enquiry and investigation before the arresting authority could effect arrest of the detainee. This is beyond the mandate of Article 22(2) of the Constitution. Article 22(2) does not sanction creation of any buffer zone where the liberty of an individual is curtailed for investigating purposes but not formally shown as arrested. Creation or contemplation of such buffer zone is unconstitutional.” (Para 43)
In reaching this conclusion, the Bench disapproved the approach adopted by the Orissa High Court in Aryaman Pattnayak, the Madras High Court in Kannan and the Kerala High Court in Arun K. Thomas. These decisions had drawn a distinction between detention during investigation and formal arrest. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation adopted by the High Courts was inconsistent with the constitutional protection of personal liberty.
The judgment is therefore an important clarification for investigations conducted under special statutes. It establishes that the existence of statutory powers to search, seize or question a person does not create an exception to the constitutional requirement of timely production before a Magistrate.
“Therefore, the declaration that the period of 24 hours for the purposes of Article 22(2) commences from the completion of such search and seizure and only from the time of arrest recorded by the arresting authority is not only unsustainable in law but is entirely unconstitutional.” (Para 43)
The 24-hour limit is not an automatic licence to detain
A further important aspect of the judgment concerns Section 58 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which corresponds to Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court identified two distinct safeguards under Section 58. First, a person cannot be detained by the police without a warrant for more than 24 hours, excluding the necessary journey time, without being produced before a Magistrate. Second, even within that period, detention must not exceed what is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.
The second requirement is particularly significant. The Court clarified that the 24-hour period should not be understood as an automatic entitlement for investigating agencies to detain a person for the entire duration. A person may be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours and yet have been detained for longer than was reasonable.
In such circumstances, the Magistrate is not required to authorise further detention merely because the outer time limit has not been breached. The Magistrate must independently examine the circumstances and may decline to authorise remand if the detention was unreasonable.
“Therefore, Section 57 CrPC (58 BNSS) mandates two limitations: firstly, the constitutional limitation of 24 hours; and secondly, within that 24 hours, the detention should not exceed what is considered to be a reasonable period in the facts of that case. This additional but salutary limitation should be borne in mind not only by the detaining authorities but also by the magistrates considering remand. In a given case, even though technically there may not be any breach of the 24 hours timeline, yet if the magistrate is satisfied that detention was for a period longer than what was reasonable, he or she may decline remand.” (Para 60)
The Court also placed a specific responsibility on Magistrates to ascertain and record the actual date and time at which the person’s liberty was curtailed. They cannot mechanically rely on the time of formal arrest recorded by the investigating agency. They must examine when the person was actually brought under official control, calculate the 24-hour period from that point and assess whether the detention was reasonable.
This direction strengthens the remand process as a substantive safeguard against arbitrary detention, rather than allowing it to become a procedural exercise in which the investigating agency’s account is accepted without scrutiny.
Connecting delayed formal arrest with the risk of custodial violence
The Court’s reasoning is rooted in the wider constitutional concern surrounding custodial violence and the abuse of investigative powers. It referred to earlier decisions, including Khatri v. State of Bihar, D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal and Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljeet Singh, to underline the importance of timely judicial oversight and safeguards against custodial abuse.
The Court recognised that the period between the actual deprivation of liberty and the formal recording of arrest can be particularly vulnerable to misuse. If investigating agencies are permitted to postpone the formal recording of arrest, individuals may remain under their control without the immediate protection that Article 22(2) is intended to provide. The judgment thus treats the 24-hour requirement as more than a procedural deadline. It is a constitutional mechanism intended to ensure that executive power over an individual’s liberty is brought under judicial scrutiny at the earliest opportunity.
This is particularly relevant in the Indian context, where allegations of custodial violence, coercive interrogation and unlawful detention have repeatedly raised concerns about the exercise of police and investigative powers. The ruling strengthens the legal basis for challenging practices in which a person’s actual detention is obscured by the terminology of questioning, enquiry or investigative custody.
Article 21 cannot be lightly subordinated to restrictive provisions under special laws
The judgment also contains important observations on the relationship between fundamental rights under Article 21 and the restrictive bail conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Tripura High Court had relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora (2026), which considered the relationship between the right to speedy trial and the restrictions imposed by Section 37. In that case, the Supreme Court had set aside a grant of bail where the High Court had not recorded satisfaction regarding the statutory twin conditions.
In Sujit Das, the Bench expressed reservations about the observations in Sukhwinder Singh suggesting that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot, solely on the ground of delay, override that provision.
The Court reiterated that Article 21 protects fundamental rights that lie at the core of constitutional jurisprudence and cannot be lightly restricted, even under special statutes. It referred to decisions including Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ankur Chadha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, among others, to support the proposition that violations of Article 21 may require the rigours of Section 37 or comparable statutory restrictions to give way.
The Bench noted that it could be argued that the relevant observations in Sukhwinder Singh were per incuriam in view of the three-Judge Bench decision in K.A. Najeeb. However, it expressly refrained from making a final pronouncement because Sukhwinder Singh was also a decision of a coordinate Bench. It further clarified that Article 22(2) had not been an issue before the Bench in that case.
“We have our reservation on the aforesaid observations made by the Bench. First and foremost, the rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India are not only constitutional rights. These are fundamental rights. Right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 are at the core of our constitutional jurisprudence. These fundamental rights cannot be tinkered with so lightly, not even under the special statutes.” (Para 49)
These observations are important for future litigation concerning prolonged pre-trial detention and restrictive bail provisions. However, they should not be read as overruling Sukhwinder Singh or as finally settling the relationship between Article 21 and Section 37. The Court’s binding ruling in Sujit Das concerns the commencement of the 24-hour period under Article 22(2), the reasonableness of detention under Section 58 BNSS and the responsibility of Magistrates to scrutinise the actual period of custody.
A significant safeguard, but its enforcement will depend on judicial scrutiny
The human rights significance of the judgment lies in its recognition that constitutional protection must follow the actual experience of deprivation of liberty. A person cannot be kept under the control of the state while the state decides when to formally acknowledge that person’s arrest.
This approach is important for people detained during investigations under special legislation, where extensive powers of search, seizure and interrogation can create situations in which the distinction between questioning and custody becomes contested. By focusing on the actual restriction of liberty, the Court has provided a basis for challenging informal detention and attempts to delay judicial oversight.
The ruling also strengthens the role of Magistrates. Its insistence that they record the actual time of detention and independently assess reasonableness can help prevent routine remand orders from legitimising detention that has already violated constitutional or statutory safeguards.
At the same time, the judgment’s practical impact will depend on how these requirements are implemented. Determining the exact moment at which liberty was curtailed may involve factual disputes. Investigating agencies may contend that a person was merely asked to cooperate, was present voluntarily or was not prevented from leaving. The Court’s test will therefore require Magistrates to examine the surrounding circumstances rather than rely on labels or formal records.
Similarly, the requirement that detention be reasonable within 24 hours leaves room for fact-specific judicial assessment. The judgment establishes the principle, but its effectiveness will depend on Magistrates recording reasons and scrutinising the circumstances of detention instead of treating the 24-hour limit as a routine period available to investigating agencies.
Implications for future litigation and human rights advocacy
The ruling provides an important basis for challenging unlawful detention, delayed formal arrests and remand orders that fail to account for the actual period during which an individual was under state control. In bail proceedings, particularly those arising under the NDPS Act, defence lawyers can rely on the judgment where the available facts indicate that an accused person was intercepted, restrained or otherwise prevented from leaving before the formal arrest was recorded. The relevant records may include interception and seizure documents, CCTV footage, station or office registers, statements of witnesses, interrogation records and the arrest memo itself. These can help establish the point at which liberty was effectively curtailed and whether production before the Magistrate took place within the constitutionally permitted period.
The judgment may also be relevant in habeas corpus petitions and proceedings challenging unlawful detention, particularly where investigating authorities deny that a person has been arrested despite exercising effective control over their movements. Its reasoning can be invoked to argue that constitutional safeguards cannot be postponed through the use of alternative descriptions such as questioning, enquiry or temporary investigative detention.
For Magistrates, the judgment provides a clear direction to examine the actual circumstances of detention at the remand stage. For lawyers and human rights organisations, it offers a basis to seek greater transparency in arrest records, challenge unexplained gaps between interception and formal arrest, and demand accountability where individuals are kept in custody without timely judicial scrutiny.
It may also inform advocacy for stronger institutional safeguards against custodial violence, including effective implementation of existing arrest and detention requirements, preservation of relevant records and meaningful compliance with judicial directions concerning custodial accountability.
The Supreme Court’s directions
Applying its interpretation to the facts, the Court found that the appellants’ liberty had been curtailed when they were intercepted at approximately 2 pm on September 29, 2025. They were therefore required to be produced before a Magistrate by 2 pm on September 30, excluding only the necessary journey time. Their production at 4.45 pm on September 30 meant that they had been produced 2 hours and 45 minutes beyond the constitutional deadline. The Court held that their continued detention beyond 2 pm on September 30 was illegal and unconstitutional.
The Court also found the unexplained interval of approximately 18 hours between the completion of the search and seizure at 5 pm on September 29 and the formal recording of arrest the following morning to be unreasonable under Section 58 of the BNSS.
The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the Tripura High Court’s order dated April 29, 2026. It directed that the appellants be produced before the jurisdictional Special Court within a maximum period of seven days from the date of the judgment, after which they were to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the Special Court considered appropriate. The Court also directed that the judgment be circulated to the Directors General of Police of all States and Union Territories, the Registrars General of the High Courts and the Directors of State Judicial Academies.
The complete judgment may be read below:
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