The recent judgment of the Allahabad High Court, delivered on November 10, 2025, acquitting Mohammad Ilyas in the 1996 Modinagar–Ghaziabad bus blast case is not merely a legal verdict—it is a devastating commentary on the condition of criminal justice in terrorism prosecutions in India.
In a meticulously reasoned yet emotionally weighted 51-page decision, the Division Bench of Justice Siddharth and Justice Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra set aside the conviction after nearly three decades, observing that the prosecution had “miserably failed to prove the charges” and that the Court was compelled to acquit “with heavy heart, as the case is of such propensity that it shocks the conscience of the society.” Humanity sits uncomfortably at the centre of this judgment: on one side, the unimaginable suffering of the victims of a terror blast that took eighteen innocent lives; on the other, the prolonged incarceration of an accused against whom the State could produce no legally admissible evidence. The Court’s decision reads as both a reaffirmation of the rule of law and an indictment of a system that permitted a man to remain imprisoned for nearly thirty years on a foundation of unreliable and inadmissible proof. Ilyas’s incarceration began in an era before mobile phones, before the internet reached ordinary homes, before digital forensics evolved—yet he continued to sit in jail, waiting for the justice that should have reached him decades earlier.
The Blast: A scene of carnage and social shock
The factual background of the case is harrowing. On April 27, 1996, a UP Roadways bus from the Roorkee depot departed from Delhi ISBT at 3:55 PM with more than fifty passengers. It halted at Mohan Nagar Check Post, where fourteen more boarded. As the bus crossed the Modinagar Police Station in Ghaziabad around 5 PM, a violent explosion tore through its front portion. The driver died on the spot, along with nine passengers. Nearly everyone on board suffered injuries ranging from severe to critical. Post-mortem reports described multiple metal fragments embedded in the victims’ bodies; doctors confirmed that death was caused by “shock and haemorrhage due to excessive bleeding.” Forensic examination established that RDX mixed with carbon had been placed beneath the driver’s seat and detonated using a remote trigger. The blast was quickly categorised as an act of terrorism, and investigative agencies rushed to construct a narrative of conspiracy. Public anger and panic were immediate. The community demanded answers, accountability, and closure. Yet, as the High Court judgment reveals, those demands were never truly met—not for the families, not for the injured, and not for the accused.
The Prosecution’s Theory: Conspiracy, foreign links and a confession
In its case before the trial court, the prosecution framed the blast as part of a larger conspiracy orchestrated by Harkat-ul-Ansar. The State alleged that Abdul Mateen @ Iqbal, a Pakistani national, served as a “District Commander” of the organisation and had collaborated with Ilyas, who, according to prosecution claims, was indoctrinated during his travels to Jammu & Kashmir. It was further alleged that the appellant facilitated travel for operatives, participated in planning meetings, and assisted in procuring or planting the explosive. However, this theory rested heavily on a single fragile pillar: a confession allegedly made by Ilyas before a Senior Police Officer of the CB-CID, recorded on an audio cassette in the presence of his father and brother. This confession became the backbone of the prosecution’s case. Without it, the surrounding circumstantial links—two railway tickets, a diary, and speculative associations—were plainly inadequate. Yet the prosecution attempted to stretch these tenuous threads into a conspiracy narrative, despite the fact that one co-accused, Tasleem, had been acquitted by the trial court itself for complete lack of evidence. The State did not appeal Tasleem’s acquittal, nor was there any record suggesting that Mateen ever filed a challenge. As such, by the time the matter reached the High Court, only Ilyas was left defending himself against the weight of the allegations—while confined in prison.
The High Court’s Evaluation of Evidence: A prosecution in disarray
The Allahabad High Court’s decision in Criminal Appeal No. 2063 of 2013 is one of the starkest examples of the justice system confronting the collapse of a terror-investigation while simultaneously acknowledging the moral burden of acquitting an accused in a case involving mass casualties. The Bench’s analysis is structured around three pillars: (1) the complete absence of legally admissible evidence against Ilyas; (2) the statutory bar on using police-recorded confessions; and (3) the total failure of the prosecution to produce any independent incriminating material.
The Court’s reasoning is unusually candid. It acknowledges the horrific nature of the 1996 Modinagar bus blast—describing it as “diabolic”, “dastardly”, and a “terrorist act”—yet still concludes that there is no legal basis to uphold the conviction. The Bench ultimately declares: “We are recording acquittal in this case with heavy heart as the case is of such propensity that it shock the conscience of the society as 18 innocent persons lost their life in the terrorist plot”.
Below is a structured analysis of what the Court actually held, how it evaluated each category of evidence, and how it applied statutory and doctrinal principles.
- The court’s construction of the factual matrix
The judgment begins by firmly establishing the factual horror of the blast. Relying on eyewitnesses, inquest officers, and medical professionals, the Bench holds that the explosion was undoubtedly caused by a planted high-intensity device. Post-mortem reports and FSL findings were decisive. Ten people died on the spot; more died during treatment; and 48 were injured.
The Court notes in the judgment that:
“In the postmortem report of the deceased persons, pieces of metal were found, and the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage due to excessive bleeding.” (Para 18)
“In report of FSL dated 30.04.1996, it is concluded that in the bus registration No. UP15A6693, mixture of RDX and carbon was kept, which resulted in explosion. It was kept in the front portion of the bus, above bonut or its left side.” (Para 7)
The device was placed before the bus left Delhi; therefore, no onboard passenger could have seen the planting. By laying this foundation, the Court underscores that the factum of the terrorist act is unquestionably proved—thus shifting the entire analytical burden to whether the prosecution proved who executed it.
- Collapse of Witness Testimony: No Direct Evidence Linking Ilyas
Hostile witnesses and the rejection of the alleged extra-judicial confessions: The prosecution relied heavily on two witnesses—PW-6 Subrati and PW-9 Ahsan—as recipients of an alleged extra-judicial confession by Ilyas and co-accused Mateen and Tasleem.
But both turned hostile, they merely admitted they knew Ilyas socially. The Court notes:
“None of the witnesses of fact produced by the prosecution to establish complicity of the appellant in the offence have supported the prosecution version. The witnesses PW 6-Subrati, PW 9-Ahsan are key witnesses of prosecution who were produced to prove alleged extra-judicial confession made by the appellant and co-accused regarding their complicity in the offence but they have outrightly disowned their statements recorded by Investigating Officer under Section 161 CrPC and have given exculpatory evidence against the appellant with regard to the present offence.” (Para 77)
Regarding rejection of PW-6 statement:
“Subrati, a witness of extra-judicial confession made by the accused, has also not supported prosecution version. His evidence is also not of significance for the purpose of present case. Even if his examination-in-chief during separate trial of acquitted accused Tasleem is taken on its face value, the same cannot be read against present appellant as the appellant was not present at the time of recording of this evidence. In the Session Trial No. 1663 of 2000 the same witness i.e., Subrati has not given any statement against the appellant or any co-accused. Thus, the witness has given two statements in respect of the same offence regarding the role played by the accused persons and legally no credence can be given on his testimony in respect of present appellant.” (Para 74)
The Court stresses that even in Tasleem’s earlier trial, the same witnesses had not supported the prosecution. The Bench treats this as a fatal flaw: there is simply no living testimony pointing to Ilyas.
No eyewitness saw any accused place the bomb: The blast occurred under the driver’s seat. Passengers boarded a bus that was already primed. The Court affirms that no witness was capable of identifying the planter, making the State’s evidentiary burden even heavier.
- The Confessional Statement: Completely Inadmissible Under Sections 24–26 Evidence Act
The prosecution’s case ultimately hinged on a single piece of evidence: a police-recorded confession of Ilyas, supposedly captured on an audio-cassette by PW-11, a Sector Officer, CB-CID.
The Court annihilates this evidence.
Absolute bar under Section 25 Evidence Act: The heart of the High Court’s judgment lies in its extensive treatment of the confession recorded by the police. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is absolute: “no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against an accused.” This statutory prohibition is a foundational safeguard against coercion, torture, or manipulation—protections that cannot be diluted even in cases of terrorism. The prosecution attempted an extraordinary argument: that the confession should be admissible under Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), which permits confessions to be recorded by senior police officers. But the Bench dismissed this submission outright, noting that TADA had lapsed in 1995 and the blast occurred in April 1996. As the Court put it, “the special exception provided under Section 15 of TADA, which allowed police confessions to be used as evidence, was not applicable to this case.” More damningly, the prosecution did not even produce the tape recorder as a material exhibit. The judges emphasised this flaw repeatedly, stating that “the device by which the alleged confessional statement was recorded… was not produced before the court,” making the recording unreliable and legally worthless. Once the confession was excluded—a mandatory consequence of Section 25—the entire structure of the prosecution’s case collapsed instantly, leaving behind no evidence capable of sustaining guilt.
The Bench quotes Section 25’s mandatory language and concludes:
“Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 bars any confession obtained by any inducement, threat or promise. Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 creates an absolute bar on confessions made to a police officer.” (Para 81)
Regarding the tape recorder not being produced, the Court notes:
“It is noteworthy that the device by which alleged confessional statement of appellant Muhammad Ilyas was recorded in an audio cassette i.e. tape recorder was not produced before the court as a material exhibit. Therefore, even otherwise, it may be held that the confessional statement of Muhammad Ilyas recorded by and before the police is not duly proved and could not be proved in view of legal bar created by Section 25 of Evidence Act.” (Para 78)
Even the cassette itself, though produced, is useless in the absence of the device, certification, or proof of integrity.
The Statement Was Not Reproduced in Testimony: PW-11, the very officer who allegedly recorded the confession, did not reproduce the confession in his sworn deposition.
The Court remarks:
“Inasmuch as confessional statement of the accused-appellant Muhammad Ilyas are not reproduced during sworn testimony of PW11 who is main Investigating Officer, who recorded the statement of accused-appellant.” (Para 79)
Thus, even if Section 25 did not exist, the confession is legally unproved.
- No recovery, no discovery, no circumstantial evidence
Items recovered from Ilyas (diary + railway tickets) are dismissed as legally irrelevant:
- Travel from Muzaffarnagar to Jammu Tawi or Ludhiana “cannot form the basis that he was involved in the present offence.”
- The diary entry naming Salim Kari is “hardly sufficient to connect the appellant.”
The Court then underscores that there is no discovery under Section 27 Evidence Act:
“No discovery has been made in terms of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 on pointing information divulged by the appellant-Mohammad Ilyas. Thus, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which creates an exception to Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is not applicable.” (Para 81)
Importantly, the Court stresses that nothing incriminating was recovered even when Ilyas was in police custody under remand:
“Consequently, after excluding the confessional statement of the appellant recorded by PW11-Sector Officer, CBCID who is the main investigating officer of the case due to the embargo created by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no incriminating material appears against the appellant which could prove his complicity in the offence. Therefore, the trial court’s findings against the appellant for the charges under Sections 302/34, 307/34, 427/34, 120-B 121-A, 124-A IPC and Sections 4/5 of Explosive Substances Act are not found to be sustainable and prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond resonable doubt due to want of legally admissible evidence against him. Thus, no chain of circumstances survives.” (Para 83)
- The court’s assessment of conspiracy doctrine
The Bench reproduces extensive Supreme Court jurisprudence on conspiracies—including Kehar Singh, Som Nath Thapa, Paramhans Yadav—acknowledging that conspiracies are usually proved through circumstantial evidence. After excluding the barred confession, the judgment observes that no incriminating material appears, therefore prosecution has failed to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, this case is distinguishable from TADA-era judgments because there is nothing left to constitute even a circumstantial chain.
“…after excluding the confessional statement of the appellant recorded by PW11-Sector Officer, CBCID who is the main investigating officer of the case due to the embargo created by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no incriminating material appears against the appellant which could prove his complicity in the offence. Therefore, the trial court’s findings against the appellant for the charges under Sections 302/34, 307/34, 427/34, 120-B 121-A, 124-A IPC and Sections 4/5 of Explosive Substances Act are not found to be sustainable and prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt due to want of legally admissible evidence against him” (Para 83)
- The application of the “benefit of doubt” doctrine
The Court cites Gurbachan Singh, Ashok Kumar Srivastava, Inder Singh, and even Viscount Simon’s classic admonition—but only to underscore that this is not a case of fanciful doubt.
The Court is explicit: it is not indulging technicalities; rather, there exists no admissible evidence at all.
The Court states unequivocally:
“The prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges that the appellant conspired to plant a bomb along with co-accused to create a bomb explosion in the bus which resulted in large number of loss of lives and injuries to the passengers and damage to public property i.e., this bus. The findings of conviction recorded by the trial court and the sentence awarded to the appellant are accordingly liable to be set aside”. (Para 85)
- The Final Outcome: Acquittal WITH HEAVY HEART
The Bench ends with one of the most emotionally direct conclusions in recent criminal jurisprudence:
“We are recording acquittal in this case with heavy heart as the case is of such propensity that it shocks the conscience of the society as 18 innocent persons lost their life in the terrorist plot”. (Para 84)
It orders:
- Immediate release of Ilyas after nearly three decades in custody.
- Cancellation of the trial court’s conviction under Sections 302/34, 307/34, 427/34, 120-B, 121-A, 124-A IPC and Sections 4/5 Explosive Substances Act.
- Compliance reports from the trial court.
The Court is painfully aware that acquittal is the only legally permissible outcome.
28 Years in Prison: A human tragedy the court could not ignore
One of the most striking aspects of the judgment is its recognition of the human cost of prolonged incarceration. Mohammad Ilyas had been in prison continuously throughout the pendency of his appeal. Nearly thirty years passed between the blast and the High Court’s verdict—years in which the world changed technologically, socially, and politically, while Ilyas remained confined within the walls of a prison on the basis of evidence now held legally inadmissible. The judgment does not dwell sentimentally on this suffering, but it does not hide from it either. The Bench notes, almost with quiet sorrow, that “the appellant has remained in custody throughout,” an observation that resonates with the fundamental principle that justice delayed is justice denied. The tragedy is twofold: an accused lost the prime decades of his life to a prosecution that could not prove its case; and the families of the victims, who lost loved ones in the blast, were denied justice because the investigation and prosecution failed to meet the minimal standards required for a terrorism trial. Both sides—accused and victims—stand abandoned by a system that neither punished the guilty nor protected the innocent.
“The appellant is acquitted of aforesaid charges. He has been in jail custody during pendency of the appeal, therefore, a release order will be issued by the trial Court in pursuance of the present judgment immediately, to secure his release from jail custody, if he is not wanted in any other case.” (Para 87)
The Court’s Final Word: A heavy-hearted acquittal
The judgment culminates in a conclusion that is both legally inevitable and emotionally fraught. The Court states plainly that “no incriminating evidence remains on the record,” and therefore the conviction “is accordingly liable to be set aside.” At the same time, the judges acknowledge the moral weight of letting an accused walk free in a case involving eighteen deaths. With these words, the Bench affirmed the constitutional duty of courts to uphold due process, even when the consequences emotionally burden the institution itself. The Court ordered Ilyas’s immediate release, subject only to his execution of a personal bond and sureties under Section 437-A CrPC.
Conclusion: A case that demands national reflection
The acquittal of Mohammad Ilyas forces India to confront a painful truth: that in the pursuit of justice for terror victims, the criminal justice system must not commit injustices of its own. When investigations are shoddy, when evidence is not collected properly, when confessions are relied upon instead of hard proof, the guilty escape and the innocent are condemned. In this case, the victims’ families have been left without closure, and an accused man has spent nearly thirty years in prison without legally admissible evidence against him. The Modinagar–Ghaziabad blast remains one of the region’s darkest moments—but the judicial aftermath has become a second tragedy, one marked by investigative failure, prosecutorial negligence, and systemic decay. The High Court’s decision restores legality, but cannot restore time. It upholds the law, but cannot undo the suffering. It acquits with heavy heart—and it leaves behind questions India must answer.
The complete judgment may be read here.
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