

SECRET

No. PS/Addl. DGP (INT)/ /2002  
Office of the Addl.DG of Police,  
Intelligence, Gujarat State,  
GANDHINAGAR.  
Date: 15/07/2002

**To;**

**The Secretary**

Justice K.G.Shah and  
Justice Nanavati Commission,  
Bungalow No. 33,  
Opp. Police Stadium,  
Shahibaug, Ahmedabad – 4.

**Sub: Submission of Affidavit.**

Sir,

As authorised by the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Gujarat State, Gandhinagar, the Affidavit relating to the area of responsibility of State Intelligence Bureau (SIB) is submitted herewith in six (6) copies.

2/- It is further stated that, the said Affidavit could not be submitted before 30<sup>th</sup> June, 2002, since SIB officers were engaged in sensitive functions relating to Lord Jagannath Rath Yatra scheduled on 12/7/2002.

3/- The enclosed Affidavit and other papers appended herewith have a direct relevance on the internal security of the Nation and so it is requested that these documents may kindly be treated as confidential and privileged documents.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,

( R.B.Sreekumar )

**Encl.:** As above

**Copy w.cs. to:**

The D.G. & I.G. of Police,  
Gujarat State, Gandhinagar

**AFFIDAVIT BEFORE JUSTICE K.G. SHAH AND JUSTICE G.T. NANAVATI**  
**COMMISSION ENQUIRING INTO COMMUNAL DISTURBANCES AFTER THE**  
**INCIDENT OF TRAIN BURNING AT GODHRA ON 27-02-2002**

I, R.B. SREEKUMAR, IPS, Addl. D.G.P. Intelligence solemnly affirm that I am aware of the facts relating to functions of the State Intelligence Bureau.

2. I have taken charge as Additional D.G.P. State Intelligence Bureau (CID-IB) on 9<sup>th</sup> April, 2002.

3. The State Intelligence Bureau has been entrusted with the duty of collecting intelligence having a bearing on various aspects of maintenance of law and order and internal security of Gujarat State. The functions of this Branch are laid down vide the Gujarat State Police Manual Vol. III Rule 461: “(a) The collection and collation of information regarding political, industrial and other similar developments or movements in the State; (b) Verification of character and antecedents, protection and security of VIPs, watch over anti-national activities, movements of foreigners and all matters pertaining to internal security, etc.; (c) Collection of intelligence regarding all types of communal activities will be an important work of this Branch (d) To keep the government informed of all the above activities from time to time”.

4. The State Intelligence Bureau (SIB) is headquartered at Gandhinagar and presently located at Police Bhawan, Sector-18, Gandhinagar and functions under the charge of Addl. Director General of Police, Intelligence, assisted by I.G. (Security), D.I.G. (Political & Communal) and three Dy. Commissioners of Intelligence (SP rank) and other officers and supporting staff. The strength at SIB headquarters is as follows: 1 A.D.G.P., 2 IGP/DIG, 3 SsP, 5 Dy.SsP, 21 Police Inspectors, 38 PSIs and 37 other ranks. In addition, the State Intelligence Bureau has 8 Regions headed by Asstt. Commissioners of Intelligence (Dy.SP rank) located at (1) Ahmedabad, (58 personnel)

(2) Gandhinagar (35 personnel) (3) Vadodara (45 personnel) (4) Surat (35 personnel) (5) Rajkot (50 personnel) (6) Junagadh (43 personnel) (7) Kutch-Bhuj (34 personnel) and (8) Deesa (11 personnel). Under the aforementioned Regional Units, there are District units which function out of a skeleton staff, drawn from the strength as mentioned above.

5. Besides SIB, there are intelligence units working independently of this office under the direct supervision of jurisdictional police officers. Such units are headed by Police Inspectors in the districts and senior level officers in the Commissionerates. It is pertinent to note that Ahmedabad City has a separate Intelligence Branch, called “Special Branch”, under the direct supervision of a D.I.G rank Officer, assisted by 3 Dy. SsP, 8 PIs, 32 PSIs and 228 other personnel. In Vadodara City, a similar Branch is headed by a Dy. S.P. assisted by 1 PI, 8 PSIs, 42 police personnel, and in Surat a similar branch is headed by a Dy. S.P., assisted by 3 PIs, 5 PSIs, and 47 other personnel. These units are tasked to collect intelligence having a bearing on internal security, particularly communal peace and report to their respective Commissioners and Ss.P. so that they can initiate prompt remedial and preventive action for maintenance of law and order.

#### **Data on communal violence**

6. Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) had announced holding of “Ram Maha Yagna” for 100-days at Ayodhya in order to pursue its declared objective of construction of Ram Temple. Accordingly the VHP Gujarat Branch held meetings at various Dist. Head Quarters and important towns (from 7/2/2002 to 17/2/2002) for the recruitment of volunteers to participate in “Ram Maha Yagna” at Ayodhya.

7. The State Intelligence Bureau (SIB) had collected intelligence in this matter, and informed all the Districts Ss.P. and the Police Commissioners vide its Fax Message No. (even) 9-HA/Ram Mahayagna/228/2002, dated 7/2/02, providing specific

data about the movements of Kar Sevaks for Maha Yagna at Ayodhya. It is therein mentioned that about 3500 Kar Sevaks would be starting on 22/2/2002 by train from Gujarat. Further, it was also informed that from 7/2/2002 to 17/2/2002 the V.H.P. would be organising 'Ram Mahayagna' at every district and taluka head quarters and also at all the temples. It was also reported that recruitment of Kar Sevaks for the ensuing Ram Mahayagna will take place in these local Mahayagnas, therefore, all the Districts and the Police Commissionerates were accordingly asked to be alert and take all precautionary steps to avoid any untoward incident. **(Appendix-1)**

8. The State Intelligence Bureau vide its letter No. D-1/9-HA/252/2002, dated 12/2/2002 informed the Addl. Chief Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Gujarat, and D.G.P. Gujarat about the activities of V.H.P. In this letter, it was clearly mentioned that V.H.P's International General Secretary, Mr. Pravin Togadia had held a meeting on 4/2/2002 at Vanikar Bhavan, Paldi, Ahmedabad, in which it was decided that 'Mahayagna' would start at Ayodhya from 24/2/2002 and it would go on for 100 days and about 3000 Kar Sevaks would be participating from Gujarat Region. It was also mentioned that if the law and order situation deteriorated at Ayodhya it would have very serious repercussions in Gujarat and it might lead to severe loss of lives and property, as it happened during the riots in 1992, following the demolition of the Babri Masjid. **(Appendix-2)**

9. Again, the State Intelligence Bureau vide its message No. D-1/9-HA/295/2002, dated 20/2/2002 informed S.P. W. Rly. under intimation to Home Secretary and D.G.P., G.S., Gandhinagar, that about 3000 Kar Sevaks under leadership of Shri Dilipbhai Trivedi (VHP leader) would be going to Ayodhya by Sabarmati Express on 22/2/2002 at 2000 hrs. from Ahmedabad Railway Station. He was directed to provide sufficient bandobast in order to prevent any untoward incident. **(Appendix-3)**

10. Similarly, the State Intelligence Bureau vide its message No. D-1/9-HA/300/2002, dated 21/2/2002 had informed all the Police Districts/Police

Commissionerates that the Kar Sevaks in large numbers would be embarking on various trains commuting from district and taluka head quarters for Faizabad, U.P. and farewell functions were also likely to be organised at these Railway Stations at the time of their departure. Therefore, it was requested to take sufficient precautionary measures and maintain adequate and necessary bandobast in their respective jurisdictions and at the Railway Stations to avoid any untoward incident. **(Appendix-4)**

11. From the above mentioned messages it may be seen that the State Intelligence Bureau had made sufficient efforts to collect intelligence with regard to the movement of Kar Sevaks from various places in Gujarat and the same was disseminated promptly to all concerned for enabling them to initiate effective regulatory and security measures. Further, the State Intelligence Bureau had sufficiently warned the SsP and Police Commissioners, from time-to-time, under intimation to the State Home Department and D.G.P. Office that any deterioration in law and order situation at Ayodhya would have serious repercussions in Gujarat, particularly on the communal front.

12. Proper co-ordination was also maintained with Uttar Pradesh Police regarding movement of Kar Sevaks to Ayodhya. A message was sent to D.G.P., Uttar Pradesh vide message No. D-1/9-HA/253/2002, dated 12.2.2002 intimating him that about 3000 Kar Sevaks were likely to reach Ayodhya by 23/2/2002. **(Appendix-5)**

13. Similarly, S.S.P. Faizabad and I.G.P. (Communal Intelligence) Intelligence Deptt., U.P., Lucknow were also informed vide message No. D-1/9-HA/296/2002, dated 21.2.2002 **(Appendix-6)** that about 3000 V.H.P. and Bajrang Dal activists, under the leadership of Shri Dilip Trivedi (VHP leader, Gujarat) were leaving for Faizabad by train from 22/2/2002 to 27/2/2002.

14. Another message was sent to S.S.P., Faizabad and I.G.P. (Communal Intelligence) Intelligence Deptt., U.P., Lucknow vide No. D-1/9-HA/312/2002, dated 23/2/2002, **(Appendix-7)** intimating that about 2800 VHP and Bajrang Dal activists

(2400-Male and 400-Female) under the leadership of Shri Dilip Trivedi (General Secretary, VHP, Gujarat) and Kumari Malaben Raval (President Durga Vahini, Gujarat) from Gujarat State had left Ahmedabad (Gujarat) by Sabarmati Express, Train No. 9165 for Ayodhya on 22/2/2002 at 2050 hrs.

**15.** Again another message was sent to S.S.P., Faizabad and I.G.P. (Communal Intelligence) Intelligence Deptt., U.P., Lucknow vide No. D-1/9-HA/316/2002, dated 25/2/2002, **(Appendix-8)** intimating that V.H.P. was to organise construction of Ram Mandir at Ayodhya w.e.f. 15/3/2002. In this connection, about 1900 VHP and Bajrang Dal activists under the leadership of S/Shri Vijay Pranami (Secretary, VHP), Hareshbhai Bhatt (President, Bajrang Dal Gujarat), Khemrajbhai Desai (President, VHP South Zone) from Vadodara and South Gujarat left Vadodara by Sabarmati Express train for Ayodhya on 24/2/2002 at 2310 hrs.

**16.** Another message was sent to S.S.P., Faizabad and I.G.P. (Communal Intelligence) Intelligence Deptt., U.P., Lucknow vide No. D-1/9-HA/327/2002, dated 27/2/2002, **(Appendix-9)** intimating that in connection with the Kar Seva at Ayodhya about 1500 VHP and Bajrang Dal and Durga Vahini activists (1200-Male, 300-Female) under the leadership of Shri Narendrabhai Vyas (President, VHP Saurashtra Zone) from South Zone had left Ahmedabad for participating in "Ram Jap Mahayagna" by Sabarmati Express for Ayodhya on 26/2/2002 at 20.40 hrs.

**17.** Moreover, in response to a message received from I.G. (CI) Intelligence Department, U.P., Lucknow, the State Intelligence Bureau requested all the SsP and CsP to inform S.S.P., Faizabad about the movement of Kar Sevaks from their respective jurisdictions under intimation to State Intelligence Bureau vide No. D-1/9-HA/259/2002, dated 13.2.2002. **(Appendix-10)**. Pursuant to the said message, inter alia, Superintendent of Police, Western Railways Baroda had informed I.G.P. (Communal Intelligence) U.P. Lucknow vide his Fax Message No. B-10/LIB/175/2002, dated 16/02/2002, **(Appendix-11)** that Mr. Prahlad J. Patel, President of Bajrang Dal, Mehsana, would be leading a group of 150-200 Bajrang Dal activists of Mehsana for the Ayodhya Maha Yagna by 9165 DN Sabarmati Express on 22/02/2002. It was also

mentioned in the said Fax Message that the Bajrang Dal activists traveling to Ayodhya would be carrying Trishuls with them. Similarly, Superintendent of Police, Mehsana also sent a T.P. Message to I.G.P. (Communal Intelligence) Intelligence Department, Lucknow, U.P. vide TPM No. LIB/415/VHP/2/1/02, dated 19/02/2002 **(Appendix-12)**, inter-alia, stating that a group of 150 Rambhakts armed with Trishuls would be leaving Ahmedabad by train for Ayodhya on 22/02/2002 under the leadership of Shri Prahlad Jayantibhai Patel, President, Bajrang Dal, Mehsana and would be arriving at Ayodhya on 24/02/2002. It may kindly be noted that volunteers from this particular group of Karsevaks/Ramsevaks led by Mr. Prahlad J. Patel, President Bajrang Dal, Mehsana, became victims in the Godhra incident on 27/02/2002 on their return journey from Ayodhya. The said Mr. Prahlad J. Patel, President, Bajrang Dal, Mehsana, was injured in the Godhra incident on 27/02/2002 and succumbed to injuries on 03/04/2002, while under treatment at Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad.

**18.** It is pertinent to note that there was no intimation from Intelligence Branch of U.P. Police or Central Intelligence Bureau, which has extensive nation-wide network to collect intelligence on developments relevant to internal security, about the return journey of these Ramsevaks who had gone to Ayodhya. Again, there was no information from Central IB or any other input from any other agency about possible attack on Ramsevaks, returning from Ayodhya, by fundamentalist and militant elements among the minority community or other anti-socials.

**19.** Moreover, the U.P. Police did not inform about unruly behaviour of the Ramsevaks, on their return journey, though there was an altercation between the Ramsevaks and the Muslims, when the latter tried to board the train at Rudauli railway station, U.P. on 24/2/2002 at 0900 hrs. **(Appendix-13)**. Unfortunately, an alert TP message addressed to all DGPs of the country about return journey of Ram Sevaks was received from IG Intelligence U.P. vide No. 13-H/VHP/2002, dated 27/2/2002 only on 28/2/2002 at 0815 hrs. viz. after the arson incident on the Sabarmati Express. **(Appendix-14)**.



**20.** The ghastly incident of arson on the railway bogie that took place at Godhra on 27/2/2002 resulting in the death of 59 Ram Bhakts, evoked extreme communal passions and vindictiveness among the Hindus particularly in Ahmedabad City, as 25 of the total 59 victims belonged to Ahmedabad. Moreover, the Hindu communal organizations particularly VHP and Bajrang Dal had left no stone unturned to whip up the sentiments of the Hindu community by projecting the Muslims as collectively and as a community responsible for the Godhra carnage. VHP, Bajrang Dal and their fraternal bodies had given a call on 27.2.2002 for observing a state-wide bandh on 28/2/2002 and this was supported by the BJP. This had created an atmosphere conducive for mobilization of Hindu mobs, particularly in communally sensitive areas of the State.

**21.** The State Intelligence Bureau had inputs about the likely repercussions of the Godhra incident on 27.2.2002. Accordingly, the SIB had sufficiently alerted all the Police Commissioners and Supdts. of Police of all Districts for taking precautionary steps to prevent likely communal clashes in their jurisdiction. The State Intelligence Bureau had sent as many as three separate messages on 27.02.2002 (**Appendix-15-A,B,C**). In addition to these messages, specific information was sent to the C.P., Ahmedabad on 27.02.2002 indicating that V.H.P. had given a call for "Gujarat Bandh" on 28.02.2002 to protest against the burning of the train at Godhra and a meeting was also called by V.H.P. at 1600 hrs. on the same day in connection with the Bandh call.

**22.** The first message was sent on 27.02.2002 vide message No. D-2/2-Com/69/2002 dated 27/2/2002 (**Appendix-15-A**) to all the Police Commissioners and the Distt. SsP mentioning that the Godhra incident would have statewide repercussions and people traveling by public transport like buses, cars and trains may be targeted by motivated mobs to take revenge. Therefore, suitable measures are needed to be taken to prevent a communal conflagration in the State.

**23.** A second message was again sent on 27.02.2002 vide message No. D-2/2-Com/Alert/71/2002, dated 27/2/2002 (**Appendix-15-B**) alerting all the jurisdictional Police units mentioning that the dead bodies would be brought to Ahmedabad City by train and, thereafter, these bodies would be taken to the respective towns for funeral and, therefore, all anticipatory security measures to prevent and forestall communal violence be initiated should be undertaken.

**24.** It was again emphasized vide third message No. D-2/2-Com/Alert/73/2002, dated 27/2/2002 (**Appendix-15-C**) on 27.02.2002 to all Police Districts that the situation arising out of Bandh call needed strict vigilance and prompt response from the Police units to avoid any untoward incident.

**25.** Similarly, on 28.2.2002, two specific alert messages were sent to C.P., Ahmedabad vide No. D-2/2-Com/Alert/72/2002, dated 27/2/2002 (**Appendix-16**) and No. D-2/2-Com/Kar Sevak/78/2002, dated 28/2/2002 (**Appendix-17**) and two such messages to S.P., Sabarkantha vide No. D-2/2-Com/Kar Seva/79/2002, dated 28/2/02 (**Appendix-18**) and No. D-2/2-Com/Alert/90/2002, dated 28/2/2002 (**Appendix-19**) and again one more message to all Police Commissioners and the Ss.P of all the Districts vide No. D-2/2-Com/Incident/Alert/85/2002, dated 28/2/2002 (**Appendix-20**) to undertake preventive actions and precautionary steps to maintain law and order. On the subsequent days, as well, large number of alert messages (**Appendix-21**) were sent to all the Districts and the Police Commissioners, as per the developing situation to upgrade the level of policing and to take measures to contain communal violence due to inter community clashes.

**26.** Certain specific intelligence data about possible communal trouble was provided by SIB to jurisdictional police, particularly to C.P., Ahmedabad City, because communal violence was persisting in Ahmedabad City, even after the initial incidents from 27/2/2002 to 3/3/2002. For instance, a report vide DO letter No. PA/RBC/02/2002, dated 15/4/2002 (**Appendix-22**) to C.P., Ahmedabad by Addl. D.G.P. Int., was sent intimating about the move of extremist and fundamentalist elements among Muslims to

resist large-scale house-to-house search operation (“combing”) by Police. Plan of radical Hindu elements to organise a large-scale assault in Juhapura, a predominantly Muslim colony, was also indicated, in this letter. Again, vide DO letter No. PS/RBC/96/2002, dated 26.4.2002 (**Appendix-23**) to C.P., Ahmedabad City information was provided on (1) Plan of Bajrang Dal leaders to distribute lethal weapons (2) Migration of Muslim families from certain areas in Ahmedabad City (3) Plan of Islamic militants, from within and outside the country, to despatch sophisticated weapons to Muslim militants etc.

**27.** Further, a detailed analytical report on the communal scenario in Ahmedabad City was sent to Addl. Chief Secretary, Home vide No. PS/RBS/90/2002, dated 24/4/2002, (**Appendix-24**) in which specific measures for achieving normalcy were suggested viz. (1) Restoration of the faith of the public, particularly, the minorities in the Criminal Justice System, (2) Replacement of the present incumbents from executive posts at the cutting edge level, (3) Need for campaigns by non-political religious leaders to expose the politicised pseudo-religious leaders (4) Action at social level (5) Improvement in security ambience for facilitating rehabilitation of riot victims (6) Purposeful legal action against publication and distribution of pamphlets inflaming communal passions etc. The above reports also covered disquieting dimensions of the communal situation in Ahmedabad City, i.e. (1) The perception of the Muslim community about themselves as a separate section of population, left at the total mercy of the radical communal elements led by Hindu organizations like Bajrang Dal and VHP, (2) Presence of a large reservoir of highly discontented section of Muslims bent upon taking retributive action against the radical Hindus, (3) Loss of faith in the Criminal Justice system by the Muslims, on account of alleged partisan role by police and other government officials in (a) Faulty recording of FIR by Muslims against Hindus, (b) Avoidance in including the names of the Hindu accused in FIR (c) Combining different transaction of offences in a single FIR, etc., (d) Reluctance of the Investigating Officers to arrest Hindu leaders, whose names were figuring in FIR (e) Hesitation in asking for police remand of Hindu accused persons, (f) Partisan role by Government Public Prosecutors in not opposing the bail applications of Hindu accused, etc. (4) VHP and

Bajrang Dal activists extorting protection money and warning merchants against employing members of the minority community in any vocation, (5) Intimidation of Muslims by Hindu radical elements from restarting their businesses (6) Efforts by Hindu fundamentalists in filling up the commercial and economic vacuum created by the migration of Muslims (7) Prevalence of an atmosphere of permissiveness in Ahmedabad City etc. Intelligence about dangers ahead was also narrated therein viz. (1) the persisting communal divide and possibility of criminal elements from both communities attacking police (2) plan of radical communal elements to drive away their rivals from certain localities (3) possibility of violent resistance to police combing operations (4) trend towards ghetto formation and such ghettos becoming veritable source of recruitment of extremists/terrorists to the ranks of Pan-Islamic and Pro-Pakistani organizations etc.

**28.** SIB had also shared intelligence received from Central Intelligence Bureau, Ahmedabad Unit, with the concerned jurisdictional officers. **(Appendix-25)**

**29.** The State of Gujarat has a long history of communal strife. Major riots have been occurring periodically in the State since 1969. Two Commissions of Inquiry viz. the Jagmohan Reddy Commission of Inquiry, (1969) and the Dave Commission of Inquiry, (1985) were constituted to go into the widespread communal violence that erupted in the State at that time. Subsequently, major communal incidents all over the State have taken place in 1990 and in 1992-93 following the Babri Masjid episode. In fact, between 1970 and 2002, Gujarat has witnessed 443 major communal incidents. Even minor altercations over trivial matters like kite flying have led to communal violence.

**30.** The ghastly incident of Godhra was unprecedented in the history of Gujarat. The gory details of this incident depicting charred bodies through print and electronic media inflamed passions of the people of Gujarat to a very high pitch. This further vitiated the social ambience, which was already surcharged due to the developments in Ayodhya and related events.

**31.** Though there were intelligence inputs pertaining to the movements of Karsevaks to Ayodhya from Gujarat State, there was no specific information about the return of Karsevaks from Ayodhya from U.P. Police or Central Intelligence Bureau, which has the onerous responsibility of timely forewarning the law enforcement officers in the state about nationwide or inter-state emerging trends, so that suitable precautionary counter-measures can be taken. The only message about the return of Karsevaks sent by the Uttar Pradesh Police was received in Gujarat police only on 28th February, i.e. after the incident on 27th February 2002. No intelligence input either from the Government Railway Police (G.R.P.), the Godhra District LIB or Central Intelligence was available about the possibility of any conspiracy or planning by the Muslim militants or any anti-social elements to attack or cause harm to the Ram Bhaktas returning from Ayodhya. The only intelligence received from the GRP indicated that the Rambhaktas, led by Prahladbhai J. Patel, President of Bajrang Dal, Mehsana, was to start from Ayodhya on 26/2/2002 night and return to Ahmedabad on 28/2/2002. **(Appendix-11)**

**32.** It must also be mentioned that the incident at Godhra took place in such a short spell of time that even before the nearest police reinforcements could reach the spot, the damage had already been done and the coach had been engulfed in flames. The meagre deployment of R.P.F. or Police personnel at Godhra Railway Station could not counter effectively the determined mob of nearly 5000 miscreants.

**33.** Nevertheless, the response of the State Government to the Godhra incident was immediate and prompt. Rescue and rehabilitation efforts commenced instantaneously. The Chief Minister, senior ministers and other officials visited the scene and the District Magistrate imposed curfew in Godhra town immediately as a precautionary measure. As a matter of fact, no major incident took place in Godhra town even during the most notorious phase of the communal violence in the State viz. 28/2/2002 to 3/3/2002.

**34.** In the wake of the call for “Gujarat Bandh” and likely repercussions of the Godhra incident, the State Government took all possible preventive and precautionary

measures. Alert messages were issued to all the field officers to maintain utmost vigil. All the available Companies of the State Reserve Police (SRP) were called in action. Realising that the forces available with the State Government would not be enough, the Central Government was requested to provide Rapid Action Force (RAF) and Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs).

**35.** Germination and sustenance of a highly charged communal mind-set, even among the sizeable sections of population, belonging to both majority and minority communities, on account of multi-faceted indoctrination and brain washing drive by well organized religious fundamentalist organizations, over a decade, has created a communally charged socio-political atmosphere in many parts of the State. Proportionate to the vulnerability and gullibility of the targeted social segments, the people also got communalized and thereby developed exclusivist, sectarian, fundamentalist, extremist, militant and terrorist frame of mind. At least a few among them had/have been getting into a consistent state of neurotic hatred towards the rival community. Consequently many in Gujarat civil society have no hesitation in indulging in violence against members of their “enemy” community, on any trivial issue or at the instigation of their communal masters. It is pertinent to note that many who take recourse to crimes as part of mob action do not commit offences in normal course of time, nor are they habitual or professional offenders. This psychology of people can be explained only in terms of magic of communal propaganda and de-humanization of the persons concerned. The impact of sensational publicity about Godhra incident in print as well as electronic media and extensive communal carnage, on an unprecedented scale, should be understood in the perspective of methodical communalization of a large chunk of the population.

**36.** It may also be appreciated that this was the first communal riot situation which was covered extensively by the electronic media. The advent of cable / satellite television in the living rooms of ordinary citizens with effective, biting and chilling live reportage by the various news channels had a deleterious effect on the overall law and order situation. Also, the print media, particularly the vernacular press, had published news on communal violence in a grossly irresponsible manner. This factor had played a decisive role in keeping up communal tension **(Appendix-26)**. In order to control

publishing provocative news items in daily newspaper like, "Sandesh", "Gujarat Samachar" etc., this office had requested ACS (Home) to take necessary action against them through DGP Office vide this office letter Nos. (1) No.D-1/Press Cutting/537/2002, dtd. 28.3.2002 (2) D-1/Press Cutting/564/2002, dtd. 1.4.2002 (3) No. D-1/Press Cutting/853/2002, dtd. 6.5.2002 (4) D-2/2-Com/Press/273/2002, dtd. 2.4.2002.

**37.** Another noteworthy point is that the pattern of violence this time was unique, particularly in Ahmedabad City. The traditionally sensitive pockets are in the walled city area, where both communities live close to each other. Accordingly, most of the security forces were deployed in such places in anticipation of communal violence on 27/28 February, 2002. However, such areas were mostly devoid of any major incidents for the first few days and horrendous violence took place in the outer periphery of Ahmedabad City, which were not perceived as sensitive areas. Moreover, in most cases, looting and pilferage were reported in well-to-do localities by people belonging to middle class, who are not habituated to mob violence. Crowds, which assembled in Ahmedabad City were in huge numbers and determined to counter and resist police action. It became hazardous even to implement the curfew. Police forces available at the non-sensitive places of communal violence were totally inadequate to deal with the situation, particularly in the initial stages. It is appreciable that despite being heavily outnumbered, police took effective and decisive action, which is evident by the fact that 2200 persons were arrested in the first few days of whom 1800 were Hindus. The police firing in the first few days resulted in the death of nearly 100 people of whom 60 were Hindus. It is evident, therefore, that the Police did not hesitate to use force to suppress the communal violence.

**38.** Going by statistics of communal violence from 27/2/2002 to 30/4/2002 the total number of deaths (including those killed in police firing) comes to 851. Of these 80.73% of death had taken place during the first five days (27.2.2002 to 3.3.2002), viz. 13% of the time span of review period and the rest 19.27% of violence took in the period from 4.3.2002 to 30.4.2002, i.e. 87% of the review period, if one goes by the death figures alone.

**39.** Another unusual, disturbing and unparalleled feature of these riots was the occurrence of widespread incidents in remote and inaccessible villages. As these areas

were not well connected by road network and so not easily reachable, the first intimation about these incidents reached the Police late and by the time Police could rush there, much damage was done. This was a new trend in the history of communal violence in Gujarat.

**40.** In the end, it can be said that the scale and magnitude of the violence was so vast and intense, and mob frenzy was so ferocious, thanks to the potential of communal organizations to effectively mobilize mobs that the available security resources were inadequate to cope up with the situation. However, due to sustained efforts and reinforcements received from the Central Government, major incidents of violence were contained, by the law enforcing agencies, within first five days of the commencement of communal violence subsequent to the Godhra incident.

## **I N D E X**

<b>Sr. No.</b>	<b>Description / Message Numbers</b>	<b>Appendix No.</b>	<b>No. of Pages</b>
1	Message on movements of Kar Sevaks for Maha Yagna at Ayodhya vide No.D-1/9-HA/Ram Maha Yagna/ 228/ 2002 Dt. 7.2.2002	1	1
2	Report to ACS (Home) about meeting of VHP President vide No.D-1/9-HA/252/2002, dated 12/2/2002	2	1
3	Movement of Kar Sevaks to Ayodhya and alerting the officers vide No. D-1/9-HA/295/2002, dated 20/2/2002	3	1
4	Alert message about movement of Kar Sevaks vide No. D-1/9-HA/300/2002, dated 21/2/2002	4	1
5	Message to DGP UP about movement of Kar Sevaks vide No. D-1/9-HA/253/2002, dated 12.2.2002	5	1
6	Message to SSP Faizabad and IGP (Communal) Int. Dept., UP about Kar Sevaks vide No. D-1/9-HA/296/ 2002, dated 21.2.2002	6	1
7	Message to SSP Faizabad and IGP (Communal) Int. Dept., UP	7	1



	about Kar Sevaks vide D-1/9-HA/312/2002, dated 23/2/2002		
8	Message to SSP Faizabad and IGP (Communal) Int. Dept., UP about Kar Sevaks vide D-1/9-HA/316/2002, dated 25/2/2002	8	1
9	Message to SSP Faizabad and IGP (Communal) Int. Dept., UP about Kar Sevaks vide D-1/9-HA/327/2002, dated 27/2/2002	9	1
10	Message to all SPs & CPs to inform about movement of Kar Sevaks to Ayodhya vide No.D-1/9-HA/259/2002, dated 13.2.2002	10	1
11	Message of SP Western Rly. To IGP Int. UP vide No. B-10/LIB/175/2002, dated 16/02/2002	11	1
12	Similar message from Mehsana vide No. LIB/415/ VHP/ 2/1/02, dated 19/02/2002	12	1
13	Intimation from UP Police about incident took place at Rudauli Rly. Station, vide No. 13-H/VHP/2002, dt. 22.6.2002	13	1
14	Alert message from UP Polioce about return journey of Ram Sevaks vide No. 13-H/VHP/2002, dated 27/2/2002	14	1
15	Alert message about communal violence vide No. D-2/2-Com/69/2002 dated 27/2/2002	15-A	1
16	Alert message about communal violence vide No. D-2/2-Com/Alert/71/2002, dated 27/2/2002	15-B	1
17	Alert message about communal violence vide No. D-2/2-Com/Alert/73/ 2002, dated 27/2/2002	15-C	1
18	Message sent to CP Ahmedabad vide No. D-2/2-Com/Alert/72/2002, dated 27/2/2002	16	1
19	Message sent to CP Ahmedabad vide No. D-2/2-Com/ Kar Sevak/78/2002, dated 28/2/2002	17	1
20	Message sent to SP Sabarkantha vide No. D-2/2-Com/ Kar Seva/79/2002, dated 28/2/02	18	1
21	Message sent to SP Sabarkantha vide No. D-2/2-Com/Alert/90/2002, dated 28/2/2002	19	1

22	Alert message to all Jurisdictional Officers vide No. D-2/2-Com/Incident/Alert/85/2002, dated 28/2/2002	20	1
23	Alert messages to Jurisdictional Officer.	21	53
24	DO letter to CP Ahmedabad, providing specific intelligence vide No. PA/RBC/02/2002, dated 15/4/2002	22	1
25	DO letter to CP Ahmedabad, providing specific intelligence vide No. PS/RBC/96/2002, dated 26.4.2002	23	1
26	Analytical report to ACS (Home) vide No. PS/RBS/90/2002, dated 24/4/2002	24	5
27	Intelligence reports from SIB	25	12
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